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THE NOT-SO-MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR:
THE TAXATION OF WOMEN IN
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
Lily Kahng†
In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court invali-
dated the Defense of Marriage Act definition of marriage as
“between one man and one woman,” heralding its subsequent
recognition, in Obergefell v. Hodges, of a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage. Windsor cleared the way for same-sex
couples to be treated as married under federal tax laws, and
the Obama administration promptly announced that it would
recognize same-sex marriages for tax purposes.  Academics,
policymakers, and activists lauded these developments as fi-
nally achieving tax equality between same- and different-sex
married couples.  This Article argues that the claimed tax
equality of Windsor is illusory and that the only way to
achieve actual equality is to eliminate taxation on the basis of
marital status.
Focusing on the taxation of women in same-sex mar-
riages, the Article explores what lies beneath the putative
equality gains that result from according same-sex married
couples the same status as different-sex married couples.  The
Article predicts, based on demographic statistics and other
sociological and economic research relating to income levels,
wealth holdings, child rearing, and employment patterns, that
women in same-sex marriages will be less likely than other
married people to reap the benefits, and more likely to suffer
the detriments, of marriage taxation.  In analyzing why wo-
men in same-sex marriages are likely to suffer adverse conse-
quences from their new tax status as married, the Article
builds on prior critical and feminist tax literature showing how
the tax law—though purportedly neutral in its treatment of
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married couples—privileges traditional marriages in which
men are the primary income earners and wealth holders, and
adversely affects married women’s incentives and abilities to
be workers, income producers, and wealth holders.  The Arti-
cle argues that the tax law, through the fictitious construction
of the married couple as an irreducible economic unit, contin-
ues to reward this anachronistic model of marriage and to
penalize other, more egalitarian models of marriage.  The Arti-
cle proposes that taxation on the basis of marital status be
curtailed through the abolition of the joint return and through
other reforms.  More broadly, the Article demonstrates how
taxation is a powerful tool by which the state regulates inti-
mate relationships, and it highlights the need for a careful and
critical evaluation of other marriage laws as they extend their
reach to same-sex relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
In its 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor,1 the
Supreme Court took a momentous step toward a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage.  The Court held that Thea Speyer’s
bequest of her entire estate to her wife, Edith Windsor, quali-
fied for the estate tax marital deduction and was therefore ex-
empt from tax.2  To reach this holding, the Court invalidated
section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which
provided:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various adminis-
trative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ re-
fers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
a wife.3
As a result of Windsor, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
began, for the first time, to recognize same-sex marriages for
federal tax purposes.  It issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17,4 in
which it announced the adoption of a general interpretive rule
that “for Federal tax purposes . . . recognizes the validity of a
same-sex marriage that was valid in the state where it was
entered into, regardless of the married couple’s place of domi-
cile.”5  Federal tax law now accords same-sex couples the same
status as different-sex couples.  Many academics, policymak-
ers, and activists lauded these developments as finally achiev-
ing tax equality between same- and different-sex married
couples.6
1 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2 Id. at 2682.  The specific provision at issues allows an estate tax deduction
for “any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his
surviving spouse.”  I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2012).
3 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)).  The Court held
that section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of a
person as protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. See Windsor,
133 S. Ct. at 2695.
4 Rev. Rul. 2013–17, 2013–38 I.R.B. 201.
5 Id. at 204.
6 See, e.g., David Crary, Gay Rights Victories Pile Up in 2013, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 5, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/05/
gay-rights-victories-2013_n_4217854.html [http://perma.cc/2J56-8GJU] (high-
lighting 2013 as a year of progress for gay rights in the United States but also
noting where the gay rights movement still needs to make progress); Brett LoGi-
urato, Treasury and IRS: All Gay Marriages Will Be Recognized for Federal Tax
Purposes, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2013, 2:19 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/gay-marriage-tax-returns-taxes-treasury-irs-2013-8 [http://perma.cc/
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Without question, Windsor admirably advances the rights
and freedoms of LGBT citizens.  It heralded the Supreme
Court’s recognition, in Obergefell v. Hodges, of a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage.7  At the same time, the expansion
of marital status for tax purposes presents an opportunity to
explore what lies beneath the putative equality gains of Wind-
sor and Obergefell.  This Article uses Windsor to re-examine the
notion of marriage equality under the tax law.  It reconsiders
whether and in what ways marital status should matter for tax
purposes.
The Article focuses on a novel group of married taxpayers:
women in same-sex marriages.  It predicts, based on demo-
graphic statistics and other sociological and economic research
relating to income levels, wealth holdings, child rearing, and
employment patterns, that women in same-sex marriages will
be less likely than other married people to enjoy significant
marriage tax benefits, and more likely to incur substantial
marriage tax burdens.
The Article’s analysis of the tax treatment of women in
same-sex marriages highlights some of the most objectionable
and least defensible features of the current law.8  In addition,
BG8S-FUWR] (emphasizing that same-sex couples married in any state that rec-
ognizes same-sex marriages will be recognized as married for federal tax pur-
poses); Annie Lowrey, Gay Marriages Get Recognition from the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2013) (recognizing that same-sex married couples will now receive the
same treatment under federal tax law as different-sex married couples); David
Von Drehle, How Gay Marriage Won, TIME (Mar. 28, 2013), http://swampland
.time.com/2013/03/28/how-gay-marriage-won/ [https://perma.cc/W366-TN4J
?type=source] (emphasizing how quickly the gay rights movement progressed and
gained popular support in the United States in recent years).
7 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  In the wake of Windsor, constitutional law scholars
predicted the imminent recognition of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
According to Michael Dorf, it is “all but a foregone conclusion that the Court will
recognize a right to [same-sex marriage] by the end of the current term.”  Michael
C. Dorf, Does the Same-Sex Marriage Cert Grant Imperil the Affordable Care Act?,
DORF ON L. (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/01/does-
same-sex-marriage-cert-grant.html [http://perma.cc/D5XQ-DH9E]; see also
Michael C. Dorf, The Question is How, Not Whether, the Court Will Find a Right to
Same-Sex Marriage, VERDICT (Jan. 26, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/
01/26/question-whether-supreme-court-will-find-right-sex-marriage [https://
perma.cc/DZD6-7QZE] (stating that “the operative question became not whether
the Court would recognize a right to same-sex marriage, but when it would do
so”); Michael C. Dorf, How the Supreme Court’s Inaction on Same-Sex Marriage
Echoes Its Conduct in the Civil Rights Era, VERDICT (Oct. 17, 2014), http://verdict
.justia.com/2014/10/17/supreme-courts-inaction-sex-marriage-echoes-con
duct-civil-rights-era [https://perma.cc/9BZG-R5U6] (stating that “most informed
observers” believe “that a majority of the Justices now believe there is a constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage”).
8 Some of the findings of the Article may also be applicable to other groups
such as male same-sex couples.  Moreover, there are other important issues relat-
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by focusing on women in same-sex marriages, the Article
builds on prior feminist and critical tax scholarship showing
how the tax law privileges traditional marriages in which men
are the primary income earners and wealth holders, and un-
dermines married women’s incentives and abilities to be work-
ers, income producers, and wealth holders.9
To show how and why women in same-sex marriages will
be taxed unfavorably, the Article analyzes three major aspects
of tax law: (1) the joint income tax return; (2) the gift and estate
tax marital deduction and other spousal transfer provisions;
and (3) the earned income tax credit (EITC).10  The first two of
ing to marriage among members of other groups that the Article does not address.
For example, Dorothy Brown has explored the taxation of marriage and children
at the intersection of race and class. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/
Penalty in Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA 45 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise
Fellows eds., 1996) (describing how black wives contribute a greater percentage to
household income, making the household more likely to pay the marriage pen-
alty); Dorothy A. Brown, Social Security and Marriage in Black and White, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 111, 123–24 (2004) (describing how white wives are more likely than
black wives to be eligible for the greatest spousal and survivor benefits and how
black wives are more likely than white wives to receive no spousal benefits and the
lowest survivor benefits).
9 See EDWARD MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 79–81 (1997) [hereinafter MCCAF-
FERY, TAXING WOMEN]; Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals
and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2002–05 (1996); Grace
Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Work-
ing Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 92–95 (1971); Bridget J. Crawford,
One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage and Wealth Transfer
Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757, 775–81 (2004); Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and
Trusts: “The Kingdom of the Fathers,” 10 LAW & INEQ. J. 137, 146–59 (1991);
Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax
Burden, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24–31 (1980); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction
QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 305
(1995); Anthony Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual
Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 612–21 (2010); Carolyn C.
Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the
1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259, 292–94 (1988); Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax, in TAXING
AMERICA, supra note 8, at 25, 38–40 [hereinafter Kahng, Fiction in Tax]; Lily Kahng,
One is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 651, 661–62 (2010) [hereinafter Kahng, One is the Loneliest Num-
ber]; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing,
and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 76–78, 96–97 (1993);
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 991–96 (1992–93) [hereinafter, McCaf-
fery, Taxation and the Family]; Amy C. McCormick, The Joint Return Rate Struc-
ture: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. &
POL’Y 241, 288–90 (1997); Stephanie McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does
Love (of Money) Have to Do with Joint Tax Filing, 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 748–57 (2009);
Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1589–99 (1996).
10 Marital status also affects taxation in many other ways, some for the bene-
fit of married couples and some to their detriment.  For example, a married couple
can exclude twice as much gain from the sale of a personal residence as an
unmarried individual ($500,000 versus $250,000). See I.R.C. § 121(b).  On the
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these—the joint income tax return and the marital deduction—
embody and illustrate the fundamental conceptual flaw in our
current tax treatment of marital status.  Congress originally
enacted the joint return and the marital deduction to privilege
traditional marriages in which husbands were the dominant
earners of income and holders of wealth.  Over time, however,
these origins have been obscured by a convenient legal fiction,
that a married couple is an irreducible economic unit.  The
fiction has grown in stature to become a first principle of taxa-
tion that is now deeply embedded in tax law and policy. Wind-
sor provides another ground for the removal of this fiction from
the tax treatment of marriage.
The legal fiction that grew out of the joint return and the
marital deduction has led to major errors in the tax law.  First,
we tax married couples equally when they differ in ways that
ought to matter for tax purposes.  Second, we tax married
couples and unmarried couples differently when they are simi-
lar in ways that ought to matter for tax purposes.  Third, we tax
unpartnered individuals more heavily than partnered individu-
als when there is no plausible rationale for doing so.  The EITC
shows how these errors adversely affect some of our most vul-
nerable citizens, low-income workers with children.
The Article predicts that all three of these aspects of mar-
riage taxation will have adverse effects on women in same-sex
marriages relative to other married people.11  However, the Ar-
other hand, the taxable portion of a couple’s social security benefits can be greater
if they are married than if they are not. See I.R.C. § 86(c).  Theodore Seto identi-
fied some 250 tax law provisions that apply to individuals related by marriage or
family.  Theodore S. Seto, The Unintended Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1529, 1531 n.2 (2008).  A Congressional Research Report counted
nearly 200 tax law provisions in which marital status was a factor. MARGOT L.
CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43157, THE POTENTIAL FEDERAL
TAX IMPLICATIONS OF United States v. Windsor 2 (2015).  The systemic reform pro-
posals discussed in Part III of the Article address many of these.
11 The Article assumes that all states recognize same-sex marriage, as re-
quired by Obergefell.  The Article does not address the difficulties that arose in the
period after Windsor and before Obergefell, where not all states recognized same-
sex marriage. See Anthony C. Infanti, Big (Gay) Love: Has the IRS Legalized
Polygamy?, 93 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1, 11–26 (2014); Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT
Elders in a Post-Windsor World: The Promise and Limits of Marriage Equality, 24
TEX. J. WOMEN, GENDER & L. 1, 26–40 (2015); Haniya H. Mir, Note, Windsor and Its
Discontents: State Income Tax Implications for Same-Sex Couples, 64 DUKE L.J. 53,
64–79, 84–98 (2014).
The Article also does not address the disparate tax treatment of couples who
choose to marry and those who do not.  There are numerous pros and cons for
each status, as scholars have explored at length. See M.V. Lee Badgett, The
Double-Edged Sword in Gay Economic Life? Marriage and the Market, 15 WASH. &
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 109, 124–27 (2008); Seto, supra note 10, at R
1547–80.  Rather, the Article focuses on the universe of married couples and the
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ticle does not advocate for a more equal distribution of the
benefits and burdens of marriage taxation among all married
couples.  Rather, it argues that marriage equality in taxation is
an illusory and specious goal.  The Article further argues that
the current tax treatment of married people rewards and en-
trenches one model of marriage at the expense of other, more
egalitarian models.  The Article recommends that marital sta-
tus as a determinant of taxation be eliminated or curtailed.
Part I of the Article analyzes the three aspects identified
above—the joint return, the marital deduction, and the EITC—
in terms of their impact on women in same-sex marriages.  Part
II provides the historical and conceptual analysis of these as-
pects, and demonstrates how our current treatment of mar-
riage is based on an incoherent legal fiction.  Part III offers a
critical assessment of the current law of marriage taxation and
recommends reforms that would eliminate or curtail taxation
on the basis of marital status.
I
THE TAXATION OF MARRIAGE BEFORE AND AFTER WINDSOR
A. The Joint Income Tax Return
1. The Joint Return
Under the joint return, a married couple aggregates their
income and deductions and computes their tax under a rate
schedule whose bracket amounts differ from the schedules for
single individuals or heads of household.12  Marital filing sta-
tus is mandatory; spouses cannot choose to file as single indi-
viduals.  They can choose to file separate returns as “married,
filing separately,” but this filing choice is disadvantageous for
the vast majority of married couples.13  Prior to 2013, section 3
disparate tax consequences of marriage within that universe.  Relatedly, the Arti-
cle does not address the tax treatment of civil unions and domestic partnerships
in comparison to marriage, an area that is complicated and still in flux.  See
Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 837–47
(2008); Patricia A. Cain, Taxation of Domestic Partner Benefits: The Hidden Costs,
45 U.S.F. L. REV. 481, 484–96 (2010); David Herzig, Marriage Pluralism: Taxing
Marriage After Windsor, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 22–28 (2014).
12 The progressive rates applicable to all taxpayers are the same but the
bracket amounts differ.  Congress enacted this separate rate structure for mar-
ried taxpayers filing jointly in 1948. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
If a married couple files a joint return, each spouse is jointly and severally
liable for the tax due on the return. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2003); Lily Kahng,
Innocent Spouses: A Critique of the New Laws Governing Joint and Several Tax
Liability, 49 VILL. L. REV. 261, 263 (2004).
13 This is because there is no advantage in the rate schedule for married
taxpayers filing separately, while at the same time, many credits and deductions
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of DOMA prevented the IRS from recognizing same-sex mar-
riage for tax purposes; therefore, same-sex married couples
could not file joint returns.  After the Supreme Court struck
down section 3 of DOMA in Windsor, the IRS announced it
would recognize same-sex marriage for federal tax purposes.14
As a result, same-sex married couples must now file as married
taxpayers, and most will file joint returns.15
2. Marriage Penalties and Bonuses Under the Joint
Return
The terms “marriage bonus” and “marriage penalty” de-
scribe the comparative tax burdens of two couples who are
similarly situated except that one couple is married and files
jointly, and the other couple is unmarried, with each person
filing an individual return.  In some cases, the married couple
will pay less than the unmarried couple—a marriage bonus.  In
other cases, the married couple will pay more than the unmar-
ried couple—a marriage penalty.  Whether a married couple
pays a penalty or bonus depends on the relative amounts of
income that each earns.  As a general matter, couples with
relatively equal amounts of income (e.g., a two-earner couple)
often incur a penalty and those with unequal amounts (e.g., a
one-earner couple) often receive a bonus.16
Marriage penalties and bonuses used to occur across all
income levels, but the Bush tax cuts of 2001 eliminated mar-
riage penalties for middle-income couples by increasing certain
brackets for married couples to twice the amount of the corre-
sponding brackets applicable to single individuals and by in-
creasing the standard deduction for married couples to twice
that for single individuals.17  Table 1 shows the 2014 tax rates
are lost or limited. See Andrew Grossman & Nick Caton, Married Borrowers and
IBR: A Trap for the Unwary, 122 TAX NOTES 1496 (2009).
14 The marriage must be “valid in the state where it was entered into, regard-
less of the married couple’s place of domicile.”  Rev. Rul. 2013–17, 2013–38 I.R.B.
201, 203.
15 See id.
16 The marriage penalties and bonuses discussed in this subsection arise
from the rate schedules applicable to married couples on the one hand, and single
individuals, on the other.  Many other aspects of the tax law, such as the marital
deduction and the EITC, discussed below, can create additional marriage bonuses
and penalties. See infra subparts I.B and I.C; see also Seto, supra note 10, at R
1547–80 (describing the myriad tax provisions in which marriage is either an
advantage or a disadvantage).
17 The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA)
enacted three marriage tax penalty relief provisions: (1) an increase in the stan-
dard deduction for joint returns to twice the size of the standard deduction for
single returns, (2) an increase of the width of the fifteen percent tax bracket for
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and brackets for taxpayers who are single, head of household,
and married filing jointly.
TABLE 1.  INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES BY TAXABLE INCOME,
201418
Single Head of Household Married Filing Jointly
10% $0 to $9,075 $0 to $12,950 $0 to $18,150
15% $9,076 to $36,900 $12,951 to $49,400 $18,151 to $73,800
25% $36,901 to $89,350 $49,401 to $127,550 $73,801 to $148,850
28% $89,351 to $186,350 $127,551 to $206,600 $148,851 to $226,850
33% $186,351 to $405,100 $206,601 to $405,100 $226,851 to $405,100
35% $405,101 to $406,750 $405,101 to $432,200 $405,101 to $457,600
39.6% Over $406,750 Over $432,200 Over $457,600
As Table 1 indicates, at lower- and middle-income levels
(i.e., income ranges specified in the 10% and 15% brackets and
a portion of the 25% bracket), the bracket amounts for married
couples are double those for single individuals, thereby
eliminating the marriage penalty for those income levels.19  For
example, a couple who each had $36,000 of taxable income
would have the same liability whether they filed as single
joint returns to twice the width of the fifteen percent tax bracket for single returns,
and (3) a $3,000 increase in the earned income tax credit phase-out start and end
points for joint returns. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107–16, §§ 301–03, 115 Stat. 38, 53–57 (2001) (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  The changes were phased in over several years,
and were slated to sunset at the end of 2010. See id.  Subsequent legislation in
2003 and 2004 accelerated EGTRRA’s phase-in of marriage penalty relief. See
MAXIM SHVEDOV, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34498, STATUTORY INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX RATES AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE TAX SYSTEM: 1988 THROUGH 2008, at 6–7
(2008).  In 2011 and 2012, Congress temporarily extended the EGTTRA marriage
penalty relief provisions that had been scheduled to sunset in 2010, and in 2013,
Congress made them permanent. See MINDY R. LEVIT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42884, THE “FISCAL CLIFF” AND THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 2012,
at 3–4 (2013).
The elimination of marriage penalties had the effect of increasing the marriage
bonus for some couples and increasing the relative amount of tax borne by un-
married couples and single people. See Kahng, One is the Loneliest Number, supra
note 9 (analyzing how the joint return for married taxpayers penalizes single R
taxpayers); see also Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., RL33755, Federal
Income Tax Treatment of the Family 19–25 (2006) (analyzing the impact of the
2001 Bush tax cuts on marriage penalties and bonuses).
18 See I.R.C. § 1 (2012).
19 Although the marriage penalty created by the joint return rate structure
has been eliminated for low-income individuals, other features of the tax law,
such as the earned income tax credit, introduce other substantial marriage
penalties. See infra notes 117–126 and accompanying text. R
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individuals or jointly as a married couple.20  At middle-income
levels, marriage bonuses persist and in fact, increased as a
result of the elimination of marriage penalties.21
At higher income levels, both marriage penalties and
bonuses occur.  For example, an unmarried couple each with
$150,000 of taxable income would have a top marginal tax rate
of 28%.22  If they married, their combined income of $300,000
would push them into a top marginal rate of 33% and they
would incur a marriage penalty.23  Conversely, a couple in
which one individual has $300,000 of taxable income and the
other has no income would receive a marriage bonus because
they could take advantage of the wider brackets available to
married couples.24
The following chart shows the distribution of marriage
penalties and bonuses in 2013 as a function of income level
and earnings equality.  As the shaded area labeled “Marriage
Bonus” indicates, marriage bonuses occur across all income
levels and are greatest for single-earner couples.  As the shaded
areas labeled “Marriage Penalty” indicate, marriage penalties
occur at low and high income levels and are greatest for two-
earner couples with equal incomes.
20 In either case, their tax liability would be $9,892.  Prior to the Bush tax
cuts, they would have incurred a marriage penalty.
21 See GRAVELLE, supra note 17, at 19.  For example, in 2014, a couple in R
which one person has $72,000 of taxable income and the other has no taxable
income would pay $13,856 if they filed as single individuals, and $9,892 if they
filed jointly as a married couple—a marriage bonus of $3,964.
22 See supra Table 1.
23 See supra Table 1.  As unmarried individuals, their tax liability would total
$70,352.  As a married couple, their tax liability would be $74,905.  They would
incur a marriage penalty of $4,553.
24 See supra Table 1.  As unmarried individuals, their tax liability would be
$82,858.  As a married couple, their tax liability would be $74,905.  They would
receive a marriage bonus of $7,953.  This calculation assumes that other aspects
of the tax law that offset the marriage bonus do not apply.  More realistically,
these other aspects—such as the exemption amounts for the alternative
minimum tax and the phase-out thresholds for child credits, personal
exemptions, and itemized deductions—might apply, and would reduce the
amount of the marriage bonus arising under the joint return. See Jane Gravelle &
Jennifer Gravelle, Horizontal Equity and Family Tax Treatment: The Orphan Child
of Tax Policy, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 631, 634–38 (2006).
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EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE ON INCOME AND PAYROLL TAX LIABILITY
FOR VARIOUS HOUSEHOLDS25
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The following examples illustrate who is likely to enjoy a
marriage bonus and who is likely to incur a marriage penalty
under the joint return rate structure.
Example 1: Middle-Income Marriage Bonuses and
Penalties
In 2014, Ward, who has $120,000 of gross income, and June,
who has no income, got married.  Ward’s 2014 tax liability as
a single taxpayer would have been $22,828, and June’s
would have been $0.  As married taxpayers, Ward and June’s
joint tax liability is $16,638.  They receive a marriage bonus
of $7,296.26
25 Nick Kasprak, Effects of Marriage on Tax Burden Vary Greatly with Income
Level, Equality, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/
effects-marriage-tax-burden-vary-greatly-income-level-equality [http://perma
.cc/8TE6-3DWD].  The chart shows the effects of marriage as a function of income
and payroll tax liability.
26 This example assumes that Ward claims the standard deduction whether
single or married.  It also assumes that they claim two personal exemptions, one
for Ward and one for June, whether single or married.  The calculations were
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Ward’s gross income: $120,000
June’s gross income: $0
Ward’s tax (filing singly): $23,934
Ward & June’s tax (married filing jointly): $16,638
Marriage bonus: $7,296
Also in 2014, Thelma and Louise, who each have $60,000 of
gross income, got married.  Thelma and Louise’s 2014 tax
liabilities as single taxpayers would have been $8,319 each,
or $16,638 total.  As married tax taxpayers, their joint tax
liability is still $16,638.  They receive no marriage bonus, nor
do they incur a marriage penalty.27
Thelma’s gross income: $60,000
Louise’s gross income: $60,000
Thelma & Louise’s combined tax (filing singly): $16,638
Thelma & Louise’s tax (married filing jointly): $16,638
Marriage bonus: $0
Example 2: Upper-Income Marriage Bonuses and
Penalties
In 2014, Bill, who has $600,000 of gross income, and Me-
linda, who has no income, got married.  Bill’s 2014 tax liabil-
ity as a single taxpayer would have been $192,191.  As
married taxpayers, Bill and Melinda’s joint tax liability is
$179,443.  They receive a marriage bonus of $12,748.28
Bill & Melinda’s combined gross income: $600,000
Bill’s tax (filing singly): $192,191
Bill & Melinda’s 2014 tax (married filing
jointly): $179,443
Marriage bonus: $12,748
Also in 2014, Ellen and Portia, each with $300,000 of gross
income, got married.  Ellen and Portia’s 2014 tax liabilities as
made using the calculator at Marriage Bonus and Penalty Tax Calculator, TAX
POLICY CTR. http://taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/marriagepenaltycalculator.cfm
[http://perma.cc/W35H-NKGV] (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
27 This example assumes that Thelma and Louise claim the standard deduc-
tion whether single or married.  It also assumes that each claims a personal
exemption on their individual tax return, and that they claim two personal exemp-
tions on their joint return.
28 This example assumes that Bill and Melinda claim two personal exemp-
tions whether single or married.  In addition, to best illustrate the marriage bonus
and penalty arising solely as a result of the joint return rate structure, the exam-
ple also assumes that Bill claims the standard deduction, whether single or mar-
ried.  In reality, most high-income taxpayers itemize their deductions, and
provisions such as the I.R.C. § 68 (2011) phase-out for itemized deductions and
the alternative minimum tax would affect the magnitude of marriage bonuses and
penalties. See GRAVELLE, supra note 17, at 19–20; Gravelle & Gravelle, supra note R
24, at 634–38.  In general, many of these other features impose additional mar- R
riage penalties, sometimes to such an extent that the penalties exceed the rate
structure marriage bonus for single-earner couples.  In this situation, a single-
earner couple such as Bill and Melinda might lose their marriage bonus. See
Gravelle & Gravelle, supra note 24, at 641 tbl.4. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-JAN-16 13:16
2016] THE NOT-SO-MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR 337
single taxpayers would have been $80,004 each, or $160,008
total.  As married taxpayers, their joint tax liability is
$179,443.  They incur a marriage penalty of $19,435.29
Ellen & Portia’s combined gross income: $600,000
Ellen & Portia combined tax (filing singly): $160,008
Ellen & Portia’s tax (married filing jointly): $179,443
Marriage penalty: (19,435)
The examples illustrate the typical patterns of marriage
bonuses and penalties, based solely on the joint tax return rate
structure, at middle- and upper-income levels (marriage bo-
nuses and penalties for lower-income couples are addressed
below in the discussion of the EITC).30  Marriage bonuses gen-
erally arise for one-earner couples at both middle- and upper-
income levels, as exemplified by Ward and June, and Bill and
Melinda, respectively.  Marriage bonuses also arise for two-
earner couples with relatively unequal income.31  Marriage
penalties for middle-income couples were generally eliminated
by the Bush tax cuts, as exemplified by Thelma and Louise.
However, marriage penalties continue to occur for upper-in-
come two-earner couples with relatively equal incomes, as ex-
emplified by Ellen and Portia.
3. Women in Same-Sex Marriages: More Likely to Incur
Marriage Penalties and Less Likely to Receive
Marriage Bonuses
Two recent studies analyzing data from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s 2005–2011 American Census Survey (ACS) suggest
that women in same-sex couples were less likely than different-
sex couples to have income patterns that resemble Ward and
June’s or Bill and Melinda’s and more likely to have income
patterns that resemble Thelma and Louise’s or Ellen and Por-
tia’s.32  That is, had they been married and eligible to file a joint
29 The example assumes that each claims a personal exemption on their
individual tax return and that they claim two personal exemptions on their joint
return.  As with the example involving Bill and Melinda, this example also as-
sumes, unrealistically, that Ellen and Portia claim the standard deduction
whether single or married. See supra note 28. R
30 See infra subpart I.C.
31 See Kasprak, supra note 25. R
32 See James Alm, J. Sebastian Leguizamon & Susane Leguizamon, Revisit-
ing the Income Tax Effects of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriages, 33 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 263 (2014); GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAME-SEX AND DIFFER-
ENT-SEX COUPLES IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: 2005–2011, at 1 (2013),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/ACS-2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GS28-EPPH]; see also Christopher S. Carpenter, Sexual Orien-
tation, Work, and Income in Canada, 41 CAN. J. ECON. 1239, 1251 (2008) (discuss-
ing findings in Canada and surveying U.K. and U.S. studies); M.V. LEE BADGETT,
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return—as they now are after Windsor—female same-sex
couples would have been less likely than different-sex couples
to receive marriage bonuses and more likely to incur marriage
penalties.
In one study, Gary Gates found that individuals in same-
sex couples had higher levels of labor force participation than
individuals in different-sex couples (81.7% versus 69.4%).33
This means that a greater proportion of different-sex couples
were one-earner couples relative to same-sex couples, although
Gates does not provide exact percentages.34  Conversely, a
higher percentage of same-sex couples were two-earner
couples relative to different-sex couples.
A second study, by James Alm, Sebastian Leguizamon,
and Susanne Leguizamon, found that 76% of same-sex couples
were two-earner couples and 24% were one-earner couples.35
Unfortunately, Alm and his coauthors do not provide compara-
ble information for different-sex couples.  The U.S. Department
of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) found that in 2010,
54% of all different-sex married couples were two-earner
couples,36 a lower percentage than the 76% Alm and his coau-
thors found for same-sex couples.  However, the two percent-
ages are not directly comparable.  First, the BLS percentage
relates to married couples, not all couples.  Second, the BLS
percentage includes couples where neither husband nor wife
works, or where another member of the household works.  Alm
and his coauthors do not appear to include these types of
couples.37
The findings of both Gates and Alm and his coauthors
indicate that same-sex couples were more likely to be two-
earner couples than different-sex couples, but neither Gates
MONEY, MYTHS AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 148–51
(2003) (comparing female same-sex couples and different-sex couples and finding
that partners in female same-sex couples are more likely than partners in differ-
ent-sex relationships to both work and work similar numbers of hours).
33 GATES, supra note 32, at 3, 8–10. R
34 Gates does not provide specific percentages of one-earner versus two-
earner couples.  In addition, Gates does not provide a further breakdown of labor
force participation for same-sex female couples or same-sex male couples. See id.
35 Alm, Leguizamon & Leguizamon, supra note 32, at 267–68. R
36 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 3,
80 (2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2012.pdf.
37 The BLS percentages could be recalibrated to include only couples where
one or both spouses works.  This would yield 68% as two-earner couples and 32%
as one-earner couples, but these calculations are conjectural at best. See id.; see
also Alm, Leguizamon & Leguizamon, supra note 32, at 267–71 (explaining the R
methodology used in the Alm study).
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nor Alm and his coauthors differentiate between the earnings
patterns of female and male same-sex couples.38  Therefore, it
is not possible to ascertain, based on their analyses, exactly
how female same-sex couples fare relative to other couples.
Nevertheless, these two studies support the premise that fe-
male same-sex couples are more likely than different-sex
couples to be two-earner couples.39
Another group that receives marriage bonuses is com-
prised of two-earner couples with relatively unequal incomes.
Whether same-sex couples in general, or female same-sex
couples specifically, are more or less likely than different-sex
couples to be in this group is not analyzed by either Gates or
Alm and his coauthors.40  Therefore, it is not possible to ascer-
tain, based on their analyses, whether the relative earnings of
women in same-sex couples tend to be more equal than those
of other couples.
However, prior research on labor force participation among
women in same-sex couples suggests that women in same-sex
couples are more likely than different-sex couples both to be
two-earner couples and to have relatively equal incomes.  Ana-
lyzing data from the 2000 decennial U.S. Census, Dan Black,
Seth Sanders, and Lowell Taylor found that 80.5% of female
same-sex couples were two-earner couples, as compared to
68.1% of different-sex couples.41  They also found that, in
terms of relative earnings of each person within a two-earner
couple, the earnings of female same-sex couples were more
equal than those of either male same-sex couples or different-
38 See Alm, Leguizamon & Leguizamon, supra note 32, at 267–71; GATES, R
supra note 32, at 3. R
39 It is theoretically possible, though unlikely, that female same-sex couples
were more likely than other couples to be one-earner couples.  This would be the
case if male same-sex couples were overwhelmingly two-earner couples and fe-
male same-sex couples were overwhelmingly one-earner couples.
40 Neither Gates nor Alm and his coauthors provide a breakdown of individ-
ual incomes within two-earner couples.  Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain
whether, for example, the relative earnings of women in same-sex couples tend to
be more equal than those of other couples.
41 Dan A. Black, Seth G. Sanders & Lowell J. Taylor, The Economics of Gay
and Lesbian Families, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 63–64 (2007).  When couples have
children, the difference between female same-sex and different-sex couples nar-
rows, in terms of two-earner versus one-earner couples.  Controlling for children,
however, does not completely eliminate the difference, and female same-sex
couples are still more likely to be two-earner couples. See Heather Antecol &
Michael D. Steinberger, Labor Supply Differences Between Married Heterosexual
Women and Partnered Lesbians: A Semi-Parametric Decomposition Approach, 51
ECON. INQUIRY 783, 798–801 (2013); Black, Sanders & Taylor, supra, at 62.
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sex couples in which males were the primary earner.42  Simi-
larly, in their study analyzing 2000 decennial U.S. Census
data, Christopher Jepsen and Lisa Jepsen found that female
same-sex couples had smaller differences in earnings and
hours worked than married different-sex couples and male
same-sex couples.43  Numerous other smaller-scale studies
have also found that female same-sex couples specialize much
less than different-sex couples in their division of household
work and labor force participation.44
In sum, the research described above provides substantial
evidence that female same-sex couples have been more likely
than different-sex couples to be two-earner couples.  Had they
been married and eligible to file joint returns, female same-sex
couples would have been less likely than different-sex couples
to receive marriage bonuses and more likely to incur marriage
penalties.45  Whether those differences will persist in the future
cannot be predicted with certainty.  With respect to work force
participation, some economists theorize that lesbian women
inherently make different choices:
Lesbian women who realize early in life that they will not
marry into a traditional household will generally invest more
heavily in market-oriented human capital, and will be more
likely to undertake a series of career-oriented decisions—
staying in school longer, taking a major that is likely to lead
to a higher-paying job, having continuous labor force attach-
ment, or working long hours—that differ from those they
would have made if they were adopting traditional gender-
based household specialization.46
This suggests that the observed differences in labor force
participation and earnings patterns may persist in the future.
On the other hand, economists also recognize that marriage
penalties on two-earner couples might change the behavior of
women in same-sex couples, so that they could begin to look
42 See Black, Sanders & Taylor, supra note 41, at 63–64.  The only group with R
a smaller “wage gap” than female same-sex couples were different-sex couples
with female primary earners. See id.
43 See Christopher Jepsen & Lisa K. Jepsen, Labor-Market Specialization
Within Same-Sex and Difference-Sex Couples, 54 INDUS. REL. 109, 126–29 (2015).
44 See BADGETT, supra note 32, at 146–66; Carpenter, supra note 32, at R
1251–52; Marieka M. Klawitter, Gays and Lesbians as Workers and Consumers in
the Economy, in HANDBOOK OF LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES 329, 334–35 (Diane Rich-
ardson & Steven Seidman eds., 2002). But see Black, Sanders & Taylor, supra
note 41, at 61–63 (finding that same-sex couples with children specialize similarly R
to different-sex couples with children); see also infra notes 48–53 and accompa- R
nying text.
45 See supra section I.A.2.
46 Black, Sanders & Taylor, supra note 41, at 65–66 (footnote omitted). R
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more like different-sex couples in terms of their earnings
patterns.47
Other scholars theorize that same-sex female relationships
are more egalitarian due to the absence of gendered power
dynamics, which have traditionally resulted in female speciali-
zation in unpaid household labor and childcare and male spe-
cialization in market labor.48  An extensive sociological
literature has found that female same-sex couples are more
egalitarian than different-sex couples along many axes,49 in-
47 See Alm, Leguizamon & Leguizamon, supra note 32, at 287; Adam Steven- R
son, The Labor Supply and Tax Revenue Consequences of Federal Same-Sex Mar-
riage Legalization, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 783, 791–93 (2012).
48 See, e.g., M.V. Lee Badgett, Gender, Sexuality, and Sexual Orientation: All
in the Feminist Family?, in QUEER ECONOMICS 19, 28–29 (Joyce Jacobsen & Adam
Zeller eds., 2008) (theorizing that same-sex couples do not engage in gendered
patterns of specialization because they tend to reject gendered roles); MAUREEN
SULLIVAN, THE FAMILY OF WOMAN: LESBIAN MOTHERS, THEIR CHILDREN, AND THE UNDOING
OF GENDER 96–106 (2004) (explaining the structural dynamic of women’s eco-
nomic disadvantage and dependence on men in different-sex marriages and find-
ing that lesbian coparent families are less likely to have either partner
disproportionally assume responsibility for a particular kind of labor); Megan
Fulcher, Erin L. Sutfin & Charlotte J. Patterson, Individual Differences in Gender
Development: Associations with Parental Sexual Orientation, Attitudes, and Divi-
sion of Labor, 58 SEX ROLES 330, 331 (discussing how lesbian couples with chil-
dren tend to divide household labor, childcare, and market labor more equally
than heterosexual couples); Abbie E. Goldberg & Maureen Perry-Jenkins, The
Division of Labor and Perceptions of Parental Roles: Lesbian Couples Across the
Transition to Parenthood, 24 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 297, 300–01 (2007)
(discussing how lesbians’ gender socialization and awareness of gender inequality
will lead them to prefer an egalitarian division of labor); Maureen Sullivan, Rozzie
& Harriet?: Gender and Family Patterns of Lesbian Coparents, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y
747, 763–65 (1996) (discussing how the gendered division of labor in different-sex
couples has led to inequality between male and female partners’ economic and
social status and finding that female same-sex couples are less likely to have one
partner assume a disproportionate form of work-home labor or be economically
dependent on the other).
49 See generally PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, American Couples:
Money, Work, Sex 448–501 (1983) (presenting case studies of egalitarian female
same-sex relationships); Letitia Anne Peplau & Susan D. Cochran, A Relationship
Perspective on Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXUALITY: CONCEPTS OF
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 321, 339–46 (David P. McWhirter, Stephanie A. Sanders &
June Machover Reinisch eds., 1990) (finding that most lesbians have power
equality as a relationship goal); SULLIVAN, supra note 48, at 63–64 (discussing R
female same-sex parents’ equal involvement in parenting); Lawrence A. Kurdek,
Change in Relationship Quality for Partners from Lesbian, Gay Male, and Hetero-
sexual Couples, 22 J. FAM. PSYCH. 701, 707–08 (2008) (finding higher levels of
relationship equality for female same-sex couples); Letitia Anne Peplau & Adam
Fingerhut, The Close Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCH.
405, 408–09 (2007) (finding more balanced division of household labor and power
in same-sex couples).
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cluding the division of household work,50 market labor,51 child-
care,52 and family decision making.53
Assuming that the differences in labor force participation
and earnings patterns persist, whatever the theoretical expla-
nation, it is a reasonable prediction that female same-sex mar-
ried couples will be taxed less favorably than different-sex
married couples.  They will receive less in marriage bonuses
and pay more in marriage penalties.54  This prediction comes
with certain caveats.  Estimating and projecting the exact mag-
nitude and distribution of marriage penalties and bonuses
among women in same-sex marriages and other married people
is difficult for many reasons.  The Census Bureau survey pro-
vides a wealth of data that provides the starting point for esti-
mates, but it may not accurately identify same-sex couples.55
Even assuming the data and analyses are accurate, estimators
must also make behavioral assumptions about how many
same-sex couples will marry in the future and whether their
behavior will change as a result of the change in tax law.56  For
50 See, e.g., Goldberg & Perry-Jenkins, supra note 48, at 312 (finding that R
female same-sex couples maintained an equal division of household work before
and after the transition to parenthood, and discussing other research showing
that different-sex couples do not maintain an equal division of work across the
transition to parenthood).
51 See, e.g., Charlotte J. Patterson, Erin L. Sutfin & Megan Fulcher, Division
of Labor Among Lesbian and Heterosexual Parenting Couples: Correlates of Spe-
cialized Versus Shared Patterns, 11 J. ADULT DEV. 179, 188 (2004) (finding that
same-sex female couples are more likely to share paid employment and household
duties equally than different-sex couples).
52 See, e.g., Sondra E. Solomon, Esther D. Rothblum & Kimberly F. Balsam,
Money, Housework, Sex, and Conflict: Same-Sex Couples in Civil Unions, Those Not
in Civil Unions, and Heterosexual Married Siblings, 52 SEX ROLES 561, 567–68
(2005) (finding that female same-sex couples shared tasks like taking children to
activities and appointments more equally than different-sex married couples).
53 See, e.g., Claudia Ciano-Boyce & Lynn Shelley-Sireci, Who is Mommy To-
night? Lesbian Parenting Issues, 43 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 5–7 (2002) (finding that
female same-sex couples shared childcare responsibilities more equally than dif-
ferent-sex couples).
54 See CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., supra note 10, at 9–10; Stevenson, supra note R
47, at 803. R
55 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY IMPACT OF RECOGNIZING
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 3 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 CBO REPORT] (noting that Census
Bureau data may be inaccurate due to misreporting by respondents or misinter-
pretation of reported relationships by the U.S. Census Bureau).  Some of the
problems may have been corrected on the latest 2010 U.S. Census Bureau sur-
vey. See Alm, Leguizamon & Leguizamon, supra note 32, at 267.  Some argue, R
however, that there are persistent flaws and biases in the collection and analysis
of data.  See Dean Spade & Rori Rolfs, Legal Equality, Gay Numbers and the
(After?)Math of Eugenics, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE (forthcoming 2016).
56 See CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 (explaining that certain R
research suggests demographic characteristics of opposite-sex couples differ from
those of same-sex couples, and therefore marriage tax consequences for same-sex
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example, some same-sex couples may choose not to marry to
avoid marriage penalties and others may choose to marry to
receive marriage bonuses.57  Some same-sex couples may alter
their labor force participation as a result of marriage penalties
or bonuses.58
Reflecting these uncertainties, past estimates of marriage
penalties and bonuses for same-sex couples vary widely.59
This Article does not attempt to provide specific future esti-
mates of marriage penalties and bonuses among same-sex and
different-sex couples.  Rather, the Article makes a general pre-
diction, based on available evidence, that women in same-sex
marriages are more likely to face marriage penalties and less
likely to receive marriage bonuses than different-sex couples.
Once data becomes available about the earnings patterns of
married same-sex couples, it will be possible to confirm
whether this is true.60
couples may differ from patterns for opposite-sex couples); M.V. Lee Badgett, The
Economic Value of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1081,
1088–91, 1106–08 (2010) (arguing that labor market patterns suggest same-sex
couples and different-sex couples will have the same incentives to marry); M.V.
Lee Badgett, Gary J. Gates & Natalya C. Maisel, Registered Domestic Partnerships
Among Gay Men and Lesbians: The Role of Economic Factors, 6 REV. ECON. HOUSE-
HOLD 327, 329–34 (2008) (describing the economic factors that might influence a
couple’s decision whether to marry or enter into a domestic partnership); Steven-
son, supra note 47, at 801–03 (examining the effects of marriage taxation on R
marriage and work decisions of same-sex couples).
57 See 2004 CBO REPORT, supra note 55, at 3; Alm, Leguizamon & R
Leguizamon, supra note 32, at 287; James Alm, M.V. Lee Badgett & Leslie A. R
Whittington, Wedding Bell Blues: The Income Tax Consequences of Legalizing
Same-Sex Marriage, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 201, 205–07 (2000).
58 See Alm, Leguizamon & Leguizamon, supra note 32, at 287; Stevenson, R
supra note 47, at 791–93, 801–03. R
59 Compare Alm, Badgett & Whittington, supra note 57, at 203 (estimating R
that legalizing same-sex marriage in the most likely statistical scenario will lead to
an annual federal income tax increase between $0.3 billion and $1.3 billion), with
2004 CBO REPORT, supra note 55, at 3 (estimating that from the years 2005–2010, R
legalizing same-sex marriage would result in an annual federal revenue increase
between $200 and $400 million), and Stevenson, supra note 47, at 784 (estimat- R
ing $20 to $40 million in annual federal revenue increases if same-sex marriage
were legalized).  Because of changes in the law that decreased or eliminated mar-
riage penalties for many middle-income taxpayers, more recent estimates are
considerably lower. See Alm, Leguizamon & Leguizamon, supra note 32, at 287 R
(estimating that the annual federal revenue impact would range from gains of
$5.7 million to losses of $315.8 million).
60 The U.S. Census Bureau could collect this data.  Alternatively, the IRS
could collect data about same-sex versus different-sex married couples who file
joint returns.  It does not currently collect gender information on joint returns.
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B. Gift and Estate Tax Spousal Transfer Provisions
1. In General
The gift and estate tax laws contain several provisions that
accord preferential treatment to spousal transfers.61  The most
basic of these is the marital deduction, which allows spouses to
transfer property to one another, whether by gift or upon death,
free of any gift or estate tax.62  The marital deduction, along
with the related spousal transfer provisions discussed below,
constitute “the single most important estate planning tool
available to married individuals.”63
In addition to outright transfers, the marital deduction is
also available for property transferred by a decedent to a “quali-
fied terminable interest property” (QTIP) trust, that is, one in
which the surviving spouse has only a life income interest.64
The effect of the QTIP rules is to enable the first spouse to die to
designate the ultimate beneficiaries of the property, with no
current tax.65  Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the
QTIP trust property will be included in the surviving spouse’s
estate and taxed at that time.66  Like all transfers qualifying for
the marital deduction, the QTIP rules defer tax until such time
61 See generally Crawford, supra note 9, at 775–81 (describing and critiquing R
the preferential treatment of marital transfers under the gift and estate tax).  In
addition to their preferential treatment under the gift and estate tax, interspousal
transfers are also tax free for income tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 1041 (2012).
62 I.R.C. §§ 2056(a), 2523(a).
63 Jeffrey N. Pennell, “Importance of the Marital Deduction in Estate Plan-
ning,” TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO NO. 843, I.B. (3RD) (2014).
64 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).  A parallel provision in the gift tax allows the marital
deduction for an inter vivos QTIP trust.  I.R.C. § 2523(f) (2012).  For the sake of
simplicity, and because testamentary QTIP trusts are much more prevalent than
inter vivos QTIP trusts, this Article refers primarily to testamentary QTIP trusts.
In addition to QTIP trusts, the martial deduction is also allowed for trusts in
which the surviving spouse controls property through a general power of appoint-
ment.  I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5).  However, as a practical matter, QTIP trusts are much
more widely used. See BORIS I. BITTKER, ELIAS CLARK & GRAYSON M.P. MCCOUCH,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 515 (10th ed. 2011).
65 See generally RAY D. MADOFF ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING
6038–43 (2014) (discussing details and requirements of a QTIP trust); JOHN R.
PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING 5047–51
(2013) (providing overview of the QTIP trust).
66 I.R.C. § 2044.  The surviving spouse may be given some control over the
trust property, such as the ability to appoint the property to herself, or a special or
general power of appointment exercisable at her death. See BITTKER, CLARK &
MCCOUCH, supra note 64, at 516.  However, the major planning advantage of the R
QTIP trust over other marital transfers is that the QTIP trust enables the decedent
to retain control over the disposition of the property. See id.
To the extent that an inclusion of QTIP in the surviving spouse’s estate in-
creases her estate tax, the surviving spouse’s other heirs can recover such tax
from the QTIP trust beneficiaries. See I.R.C. § 2207A.
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as the surviving spouse transfers the property, provided that
the surviving spouse does not consume the property.67  How-
ever, unlike other marital transfers, the surviving spouse typi-
cally has no control over the disposition of the property in a
QTIP trust.68
Another spousal transfer provision is “gift splitting,” which
Congress enacted in the Revenue Act of 1948 (the 1948 Act), at
the same time as the marital deduction.69  Under the gift split-
ting provision, a gift made by one spouse to a third party is
deemed to be made one-half by each spouse, provided both
spouses consent to this treatment.70  This can have the effect of
doubling the amounts the donor spouse can transfer tax free.
In the absence of gift splitting, the donor spouse would be able
to make tax-free transfers of up to $14,000 per year (in 2014) to
an unlimited number of donees—the “annual exclusion.”71  On
top of annual exclusions transfers, the donor spouse would be
able to transfer an additional $5.34 million (as of 2014) over the
course of his or her life and at death—the “exemption
amount.”72  Gift splitting allows the donor spouse to use the
spouse’s annual exclusion and exemption amount, in effect
doubling the amounts he or she can transfer tax free to
$28,000 per donee and $10.68 million, under the annual ex-
clusion and the exemption amounts, respectively.73
67 See Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the
Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729, 1731–32 (1998).
68 See id. at 1729–30.
69 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 374, 62 Stat. 110, 127–28 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
70 I.R.C. § 2513(a)(1).  Both spouses must consent to gift splitting, which
applies to all gifts made by either spouse during the year. Id.  Both spouses must
be U.S. citizens or residents. Id.  In addition, the consenting spouse cannot have
a general power of appointment over the property transferred by the donor
spouse; nor can she have an interest in the transferred property unless the
interest in the property transferred to the third party is ascertainable and severa-
ble. See generally Diane S.C. Zeydel, Gift-Splitting: A Boondoggle or a Bad Idea? A
Comprehensive Look at the Rules, 106 J. TAX’N 334, 338–43 (2007) (discussing
spousal interests in gift splitting).
71 I.R.C. § 2503(b).  The exclusion applies to gifts of present interests.  The
maximum amount of the exclusion is indexed for inflation and was $14,000 as of
2014. See Rev. Proc. 2013–47, I.R.B. 537, 543.
72 I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505.  The statutory exemption amount is $5 million, in-
dexed for inflation beginning in 2012.  I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(A)–(B).  It was $5.34
million for individuals dying in 2014. See id.  Transfers in excess of the exemption
amount are taxed at a flat rate of 40%.  I.R.C. § 2001(c).
73 Presumably, a spouse with no wealth of her own to transfer would have no
objection to gift splitting.  On the other hand, a spouse with wealth of her own
would have an interest in preserving her ability to make tax-free transfers to her
own objects of bounty. See infra notes 88–99 and accompanying text. R
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A final provision relating to spousal transfers allows the
estate of decedent with a surviving spouse to make a “portabil-
ity” election, under which any unused portion of the decedent’s
exemption amount carries over to the surviving spouse.74
Thus, for example, if the decedent made no taxable transfers
during his or her life or at death, the unused exemption
amount of $5.34 million (in 2014) would “port” to the surviving
spouse, whose exemption amount would then total $10.68
million.
Under section 3 of DOMA, same-sex married couples were
not treated as married for purposes of the marital deduction.75
Windsor struck down section 3 of DOMA and held that trans-
fers by the decedent to her same-sex spouse qualified for the
estate tax marital deduction.76  As a result, same-sex married
couples can now use all spousal transfer provisions, including
the marital deduction, gift splitting, QTIP trusts, and
portability.
2. Beneficiaries of the Spousal Transfer Provisions
The spousal transfer provisions described above are availa-
ble to all married individuals, but an individual must have
wealth to transfer in order to use them at all.77  In addition, the
74 I.R.C. § 2010(c)(4)–(5).  Congress first enacted the portability provisions as
a temporary, two-year measure in 2010.  Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–312 §§ 302(a)(1),
303(a), 304, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 26 U.S.C.).  Congress made the provisions permanent in 2012.  American
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240 § 101(a), 126 Stat. 2313 (2012)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
75 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199 § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419–20
(1996).
76 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
77 The marital deduction historically benefitted transfers from husbands to
wives because men were the principal holders of wealth and typically transferred
that wealth to their wives at death.  As discussed below, the marital deduction
originally allowed a husband to transfer one-half of his wealth to his wife tax free,
in order to mimic the treatment of marital transfers in community property states.
The one-half limitation on the deduction was eliminated in 1981. See infra notes
164–85 and accompanying text. R
This is not to say that only husbands qua wealth holders benefitted from the
marital deduction.  Because the incidence of the estate tax falls on the recipients
of wealth transfers, a wife might also benefit to the extent her inheritance was not
diminished by the estate tax, depending on whether she or other heirs bore the
brunt of any estate tax liability.  However, even if wives did sometimes reap the
benefit of the marital deduction in the form of larger inheritances, husbands also
enjoyed the benefit of being able to direct the transfer of a greater amount of
wealth.
It should also be noted that husbands usually did not transfer property
outright to their widows.  Rather, they would typically transfer the property in
trust with a life estate to the widow and remainder to their offspring, to “protect”
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exemption amount is now so large ($5.34 million in 2014, to be
adjusted for inflation in the future) that only very wealthy indi-
viduals will incur any gift or estate tax at all, whether or not
they can take advantage of spousal transfer provisions.78
Nonetheless, the number of individuals potentially subject to
the gift and estate tax, and the amount of wealth at stake, is
substantial.  For example, in 2007, there were an estimated 2.3
million U.S. adults owning $2 million or more in gross assets,
and the group as a whole owned more than $12 trillion in net
worth.79  A 2014 worldwide survey of super wealthy individuals
(those with a net worth of $30 million or higher) estimated that
there are 69,560 U.S. individuals with a net worth of $30 mil-
lion or higher, with total wealth holdings of $9.63 trillion.80
This group is projected to transfer $6.35 trillion of wealth over
the next thirty years.81  For these individuals, the potential tax
savings of spousal transfer provisions such as the marital de-
duction, portability, gift splitting, and QTIP trusts are
significant.
Exactly who benefits from the spousal transfer provisions
depends on a variety of factors.82  The marital deduction may
benefit an individual who transfers wealth to his or her spouse
because the absence of tax enables the individual to direct the
transfer of a larger amount of wealth (whether to his or her
spouse or to others).  It also benefits the transferee spouse by
increasing the amount of the gift or bequest received, if he or
she otherwise would have borne the incidence of any gift or
estate tax due.83  Ultimately, the marital deduction could be
the widows from unwise investment decisions and predatory fortune hunters and
to ensure that the offspring were not disinherited.  This form of transfer is the
prototype for the QTIP trust, which qualifies for the marital deduction. See infra
sections II.A.2, II.B.2.
78 See CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.  In 2009, when Thea R
Spyer died, the exemption amount was $3.5 million.  Under today’s exemption
amount, her entire estate would be tax free.
79 Brian Raub & Joseph Newcomb, Internal Rev. Serv. Stat. of Inc. Div.,
Personal Wealth, 2007, 31 STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2012, at 156, 164–65.
80 Wealth-X and UBS World Ultra Wealth Report 2014, WEALTH-X, 40–41
(2014), http://www.worldultrawealthreport.com/ [http://perma.cc/8RLQ-
JARS].
81 Wealth-X and NFP Family Wealth Transfers Report, WEALTH-X, 24 (2014),
http://www.wealthx.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/WealthX_NFP_Family
WealthTransfersReport-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/B7AX-8H5C].
82 See Crawford, supra note 9, at 775–81. R
83 Whether the surviving spouse would bear the incidence of a tax in the
absence of the marital deduction depends on whether there are other heirs who
might bear the brunt of any added tax liability and whether the transferor spouse
might change his or her donative or testamentary plan to take account of the
added tax liability.  However, even if the surviving spouse does sometimes reap
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viewed as benefitting other transferees who will be the recipi-
ents of the married couple’s wealth, for example, children or
grandchildren.84
Portability is still so new that the estate planning commu-
nity has yet to explore fully its implications.  It has the potential
to be a powerful tool for increasing a wealthy individual’s ability
to transfer more of his wealth tax free, should he have a non-
propertied spouse who predeceases him.85  It also might result
in wealthy individuals transferring more of their wealth out-
right to their spouses because the decedent’s unused exemp-
tion amount, instead of being wasted, will now carry over to the
surviving spouse.86  On the other hand, portability may have
the effect of increasing the popularity of QTIP trusts as a way
for a moneyed spouse to retain control over the ultimate dispo-
sition of his wealth.87
the benefit of the marital deduction in the form of larger inheritances, the trans-
feror spouse also enjoys the benefit of being able to direct the transfer of a greater
amount of wealth.
The marital deduction also creates an incentive for a wealthy individual to
transfer wealth to his spouse instead of third parties.  As discussed below, Con-
gress created this incentive unintentionally and it caused a great deal of alarm in
the estate planning community.  The incentive was eliminated with the enactment
of the QTIP trust rules in 1981.
84 Who ultimately benefits from tax savings of the marital deduction and the
other marital transfer provision is a highly complex question.  It depends more
generally on the effects that gift and estate taxes have on individuals’ behavior,
which in turn depends on the patterns of, and motives for, intergenerational
transfers. See William G. Gale & Maria G. Perozek, Do Estate Taxes Reduce
Saving?, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 216, 235–37 (William G. Gale et
al. eds., 2001).
85 One practitioner joked about trafficking in exemption amounts when port-
ability was first enacted in 2010:
Maybe I should retire from the practice of law, get ordained so I can
perform marriages, and start a match-making service where I pair
up and marry destitute seniors in nursing homes to wealthy unmar-
ried individuals.
Jerry Cooper, Advisors Predict Obama Tax Deal Will Hurt Trust Business, TR.
ADVISOR (Dec. 12, 2010), http://thetrustadvisor.com/news/estatedeal [http://
perma.cc/J8GM-FGV9] (quoting David Diamond).
86 Before portability, if a decedent transferred his entire estate to his surviv-
ing spouse, his exemption amount would be wasted.  The traditional strategy for
avoiding this is to create a “bypass” or “credit shelter” trust—specifically designed
not to qualify for the marital deduction—and to fund it with an amount sufficient
to use the decedent’s exemption. See Bridget J. Crawford & Wendy C. Gerzog,
Portability, Marital Wealth Transfers, and the Taxable Unit, in CONTROVERSIES IN TAX
LAW: A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE 247, 253–54 (Anthony C. Infanti ed., 2015); RICHARD
S. FRANKLIN ET AL., Portability—The Game Changer, 2013 A.B.A. REAL PROP. TR. &
EST. L. SEC., 2–4; John A. Miller & Jeffrey A. Maine, Wealth Transfer Tax Planning
for 2013 and Beyond, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 879, 934–40 (2013).
87 See Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., Portability or No: The Death of the
Credit-Shelter Trust?, 118 J. TAX’N 232, 237–48 (2013); FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note
86, at 2–4, 14–17; Sisi C. Tran, Convergent Wealth Advisors, Achieving Tax Bene- R
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Gift splitting and QTIP trusts are most advantageous for a
wealthy individual whose spouse has little wealth, and in the
case of QTIP trusts, where the decedent is older than his or her
spouse and/or has children from a prior marriage.  In other
words, these provisions are most beneficial where there are
inequalities of wealth, age, and power between two spouses.88
Gift splitting enables a married individual to double the
annual exclusion amount(s) and exemption amount by using
the annual exclusion amount(s) and exemption amount of his
or her spouse, provided the spouse consents.89  However, if the
consenting spouse has wealth of his or her own, he or she may
want to preserve the ability to make tax-free transfers to his or
her own objects of bounty.  Because the annual exclusion ap-
plies to an unlimited number of donees, gift splitting will not
affect the consenting spouse’s ability to make annual exclusion
transfers to different beneficiaries.  (In this case, gift splitting
could benefit both spouses because each would be able to
transfer $28,000 to each of their respective beneficiaries.90)
However, if the consenting spouse wishes to make transfers to
the same beneficiaries as the donor spouse—for example, their
children or grandchildren—then gift splitting will constrain his
or her ability to transfer his or her own wealth. Furthermore, if
the consenting spouse wishes to make transfers of his or her
own wealth in excess of the annual exclusion amount, the split
gift election will also constrain his or her ability to use the
$5.34 million exemption amount to shelter those transfers
from tax.  Thus, a propertied individual with a nonpropertied
spouse stands to gain the most benefit from the split gift
election.
Like gift splitting, the QTIP trust is advantageous for a
wealthy individual who wishes to transfer property to third
parties and whose spouse does not have wealth.  A QTIP trust
defers the estate tax liability on transfers to the remainder
beneficiaries until the death of the surviving spouse; at which
point the trust remainder will be included in the estate of the
fits Through the Inter Vivos QTIP Trust (Apr. 2013), at 1, 4–8, http://
www.convergentwealth.com/sites/default/files/insight/Achieving%20Tax
%20Benefits%20through%20the%20Inter%20Vivos%20QTIP%20Trust_%28April
%202013%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/6TQG-EWN2].
88 See Crawford, supra note 9, at 775–81.  Historically, the QTIP trust and gift R
splitting benefitted wealthy husbands whose wives had little or no wealth of their
own. See infra note 99 and accompanying text. R
89 See Crawford, supra note 9, at 780–81. R
90 This strategy will not work if the “crossed gift” doctrine applies. See Sather
v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 456 (1999).
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surviving spouse, sheltered from tax by his or her exclusion
amount.91  Perhaps even more importantly, the decedent re-
tains control over the disposition of the QTIP property, even
though it is taxed as part of the surviving spouse’s estate.  This
ability to retain control allows a decedent to assuage anxieties
that the surviving spouse will deplete the trust property or
disinherit the decedent’s heirs, particularly the decedent’s chil-
dren from a previous marriage.92
The following example illustrates who is likely to benefit
from the QTIP trust marital deduction.
Example 3: Marital Deduction for QTIP Trust
Donald dies in 2014 with an estate valued at $100 million.
(Assume Donald’s $5.34 million exemption amount is already
exhausted.)  Donald’s will transfers his entire estate to a QTIP
trust, under which his widow Melania will receive a life in-
come interest.  Upon her death, the trust corpus will be dis-
tributed in equal shares to Donald’s three children (Donald,
Jr., Ivanka, and Eric) with his first wife, Ivana; his daughter
(Tiffany) with his second wife, Marla; and his son (Barron)
with Melania.  Donald’s estate may deduct the entire $100
million transfer to the trust and his estate tax liability is $0.
Upon Melania’s death, the trust corpus will be subject to tax
in her estate even though she has no control over its disposi-
tion.  If she has not otherwise used her exemption amount, it
will shelter from tax $5.34 million (indexed for inflation) of
the corpus.
3. Women in Same-Sex Marriages: Less Likely to Benefit
from Spousal Transfer Provisions
Little is known about the wealth holdings and wealth
transfer patterns of same-sex couples.93  However, it is possible
to make a set of informed guesses that women in same-sex
91 See Blattmachr et al., supra note 87, at 237.  The decedent could achieve R
the same advantageous tax result by transferring property outright to the surviv-
ing spouse but would forego control over the ultimate disposition of the property.
See id. at 240.  The ability to retain control is a major advantage of the QTIP trust
relative to outright transfer. See id. at 237, 240; Tran, supra note 87, at 5. R
92 Miller & Maine, supra note 86, at 938–39. R
93 See 2004 CBO REPORT, supra note 55, at 3–4.  For a study examining R
attitudes toward the extension of intestacy laws to same-sex couples, see gener-
ally Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1998) (considering committed same-sex couples and
inheritance law).  The only other sources of information on wealth holdings and
wealth transfer patterns of same-sex couples are private market research studies.
See, e.g., PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC., THE LBGT FINANCIAL EXPERIENCE: 2012–2013
PRUDENTIAL RESEARCH STUDY (2012), http://www.prudential.com/media/man
aged/Prudential_LGBT_Financial_Experience.pdf [http://perma.cc/6V2E-LRF9].
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marriages are less likely than individuals in different-sex mar-
riages to reap the benefits of the spousal transfer provisions
described above.
To begin with, women in general are less wealthy than
men.94  They are less likely to benefit from spousal transfer
provisions such as the marital deduction, gift splitting, or QTIP
trusts, simply because they have less wealth to transfer.
Whether women in same-sex marriages have less wealth than
other married individuals is not known at this time.95  There is
some evidence that lesbians earn more than other women,
which suggests they might, on average, be wealthier than other
women.96
To what extent women in same-sex marriages will be able
to take advantage of gift splitting depends, as discussed above,
on whether there are wealth inequalities between spouses.
There is not yet broad data about this, but research indicates
women in same-sex couples in general tend to be more egalita-
rian in many respects.97  This suggests that they might also be
more equal in their wealth holdings, but this is quite
speculative.
94 In 2007, about 43% of top wealth holders (those with assets of $2 million or
more) were women. See Raub & Newcomb, supra note 79, at 164–65.  The per- R
centage of women within the wealthiest 0.5% increased from about 25% during
the 1920s to about 45% during the 1990s.  Wojciech Kopczuk & Emmanuel Saez,
Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916-2000: Evidence from Estate Tax
Returns, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 445, 465 (2004).  There has been a narrowing of the
wealth disparity between men and women in recent years.  The apparent increase
in women’s wealth, however, may be somewhat deceptive because the data is
derived from federal estate tax returns, and the estates of many women include
QTIP trust assets that would have been included in the estates of their deceased
spouses in the absence of the QTIP rules. See id.; Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel
Slemrod, The Impact of Estate Tax on Wealth Accumulation and Avoidance Behav-
ior, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, supra note 84, at 299, 325. R
A worldwide survey of the super wealthy (those with a net worth of $30 million
or more) found that of the 69,560 U.S. individuals in the group, only 13% were
women. WEALTH-X & UBS, WORLD ULTRA WEALTH REPORT 2014 41 (2014), http://
www.worldultrawealthreport.com/ [http://perma.cc/8RLQ-JARS].  Women in
this group had an average net worth of $160 million, $28 million more than their
male counterparts. See id.
95 It may be possible to ascertain this in the future if the IRS begins to collect
gender information on estate tax returns.
96 See, e.g., Dan Black et al., The Earnings Effects of Sexual Orientation, 56
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 449, 462–63 (2003) (finding an earnings premium for
lesbians in the range of 20% to 30%); Marieka Klawitter, Meta-Analysis of the
Effect of Sexual Orientation on Earnings, 54 INDUS. REL. J. ECON. & SOC. 4, 13, 21
(2015) (surveying thirty-one studies and finding on average an earnings premium
of 9% for lesbians compared to heterosexual women; but also noting a wide
variance in the studies’ results).
97 See infra note 100 and accompanying text. R
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The QTIP trust historically benefitted transfers from hus-
bands to wives.  This is true for two reasons.  First, husbands
were more likely to predecease their wives because they tended
to be older than their wives and also had a shorter life expec-
tancy.98  Second, men owned more wealth than women.99  To-
day, husbands are still more likely to predecease their wives,100
and men continue to be wealthier than women.101
In different-sex marriages, women in general are less likely
than men to use QTIP trusts.  For 1995 decedents for whom
estate tax returns were filed, 20% of male decedents used QTIP
trusts while 8% of female decedents used QTIP trusts.102  In
the same year, male decedents used QTIP trusts for assets
valued at $13.3 billion while female decedents used QTIPs for
assets valued at $3.2 billion.103  This is in part because women
have less wealth than men, although they appear to be gaining
ground.104  Another reason for the difference in the use of QTIP
trusts is that female wealth holders are older than male wealth
holders and are more likely to be widowed.105  Whether for
cultural or biological reasons or both, the practice of divorcing
one’s offensively termed “starter wife” to marry one or more in a
series of younger “trophy wives” (also an offensive term), and
produce an offspring or two out of each marriage, seems a
singularly male pattern of behavior.106  A wealthy woman is
98 See infra note 100 and accompanying text. R
99 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. R
100 Women still have longer life expectancies than men. Tom Eskes & Clemens
Haanen, Why Do Women Live Longer than Men?, 133 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY & REPROD. BIOLOGY 126, 127 (2007) (reporting that women live four to five
years longer than men).  In addition, husbands continue on average to be older
and to earn more than their wives. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY, TABLE FG3, MARRIED COUPLE FAMILY GROUPS, BY PRESENCE OF OWN CHIL-
DREN/1 UNDER 18, AND AGE, EARNINGS, EDUCATION, AND RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN/2
OF BOTH SPOUSES: 2013 (reporting that wives are at least two years younger than
their husbands in 52.7% of different-sex marriages; within one year of the same
age in 33.2% of different-sex marriages; at least two years older than their hus-
bands in 14.1% of different-sex marriages; and earn at least $5,000 less than
their husbands in 54.3% of different-sex marriages; earn within $5,000 of their
husbands in 25.2% of different-sex marriages; and at least $5,000 more than
their husbands in 20.4% of different-sex marriages).
101 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. R
102 See Barry W. Johnson et al., Elements of Federal Estate Taxation, in RE-
THINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, supra note 84, at 65, 101–03. R
103 See id. at 103.  Although fewer female decedents used QTIP trusts, those
who did use them placed a greater proportion of the marital bequest property in
the QTIP trusts than males with comparable estate sizes. See id. at 102.
104 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. R
105 Raub & Newcomb, supra note 79, at 157. R
106 To the extent it is culturally based, that might change, and there is some
evidence that women are emulating this pattern. See Sarah Kershaw, Rethinking
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less likely than her male counterpart to marry a series of
younger spouses and therefore is less likely to use a QTIP
trust—what one practitioner calls a “Donald Trump arrange-
ment.”107  QTIP trusts are used predominantly by wealthy hus-
bands and appear to reflect a “deeply patriarchal outlook” that
a male decedent must ensure that his widow will not squander
the estate or disinherit the decedent’s children.108
There is no analogous gendered analysis of QTIP trusts for
female same-sex marriages because the wealth transfers occur
between women.  However, as mentioned above, women are
less wealthy than men, and thus, women in same-sex mar-
riages are less likely to benefit from the marital deduction than
people in different-sex marriages simply because they have less
wealth to transfer.109  Furthermore, based on what we know
about female same-sex marriage patterns, women in same-sex
marriages are even less likely than heterosexual women to use
QTIP trusts for a “Donald Trump arrangement.”110
QTIP trusts are very popular with men even when they are
not serial monogamist moguls like Donald Trump.111  Scholars
and practitioners theorize that men favor QTIP trusts because
the Older Woman-Younger Man Relationship, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2009).  On the
other hand, there are currently biological constraints on fertility that make it
impossible for a woman to perpetuate her genetic material with a series of younger
male partners.
107 Charles Delafuente, A Guiding Hand for Bequests, Beyond the Grave, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012) (quoting estate planning lawyer Richard J. Shapiro).
108 Dodge, supra note 67, at 1734. R
109 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. R
110 Little is known about the wealth transmission patterns of same-sex
couples. See supra note 93.  In its report on the budgetary impacts of same-sex R
marriage legalization, for purposes of determining the estate tax revenue impact,
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assumes that same-sex married couples
will behave like other married couples in their inheritance patterns. See 2004
CBO REPORT, supra note 55, at 4.  Thus, it assumes that most same-sex spouses R
will bequeath their property to their surviving spouses, thereby availing them-
selves of the marital deduction. See id.  The CBO does not address QTIP trusts.
See id. There is possibly an indirect reference to QTIP trusts (“marriage can defer
the payment of estate taxes until the death of the second spouse”), but there is no
discussion of whether same-sex couples might differ from different-sex couples in
the use of QTIP trusts. See id.  There is also a mention of anecdotal evidence that
same-sex couples tend to make more charitable bequests than different-sex
couples. See id.
111 See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.  Female decedents also R
use QTIP trusts, but with less frequency. See id.
Recent changes to the gift and estate tax, such as the increased exemption
amount and the portability of any unused exemption amount from the decedent
to the surviving spouse, may add to the attractiveness of QTIP trust as a way for a
moneyed spouse to retain control over the ultimate disposition of his wealth. See
FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 86, at 2–4, 14–18; Blattmachr et al., supra note 87, at R
236–38; Tran, supra note 87, at 4–7. R
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they worry that their widows will over-consume the assets of
the estate or be incompetent to manage the assets.112  Because
female same-sex relationships appear less likely to incorporate
traditional male-female wealth disparities and power dynam-
ics, the motivations of control, dominance, and paternalism
that underlie QTIP trusts are less likely to be present.
In less extreme circumstances than the “Donald Trump
arrangement,” the QTIP trust is a useful planning device for
married couples who have children from former relationships,
even those whose estates do not exceed the exemption and who
will therefore receive no tax benefit from a QTIP trust.113
Same-sex couples often have children from prior different-sex
marriages114 and, to this extent, will benefit from the non-tax
planning advantages of QTIP-type trusts.115  The tax advan-
tages of the QTIP trusts, however, inure primarily to the benefit
of the Donald Trumps of the world—wealthy, male, serial mo-
nogamists who marry younger women with little wealth of their
own.
In sum, it is likely that, compared to individuals in differ-
ent-sex marriages, women in same-sex marriages will benefit
less from the marital deduction simply because they have less
wealth than men.  Furthermore, women in same-sex marriages
are likely to benefit less from gift splitting and QTIP trusts
because these provisions provide the most benefit to spouses
with unequal wealth holdings, and women in same-sex mar-
riages tend to have more equal amounts of wealth and income
(as far as we know).  Finally, women in same-sex marriages are
less likely to benefit from QTIP trusts because they are unlikely
to follow the traditional model of male wealth ownership and
transfer embodied in the QTIP trust.
112 See supra notes 87–88. R
113 See MADOFF ET AL., supra note 65, at 6041. R
114 See Gary J. Gates, Family Formation and Raising Children Among Same-
Sex Couples, NAT’L COUNCIL ON FAM. REL. REP. MAG., Winter 2011, at F1, F2.
115 In the aftermath of Windsor, estate planning advisers routinely list QTIP
trusts as one of the estate planning devices available to same-sex married
couples, but there is no mention made about whether same-sex couples will
actually want to use them. See, e.g., Mary Hickok et al., Why Trusts Still Matter:
The Brave New World of Estate Planning, WILMINGTON TR. ISSUES & INSIGHTS, Sept.
2015, at 1, 3, https://www.wilmingtontrust.com/repositories/wtc_sitecontent/
PDF/2013_Why_Trusts_Matter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XTC-KVQ2] (noting that
same-sex married couples gained access to QTIP trusts following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Windsor); Ray Prather, Estate Planning and Charitable Giving
for Same-Sex Couples After United States v. Windsor, PROB. & PROP. MAG.,
Sept.–Oct. 2014 (discussing the effects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wind-
sor on same-sex married couples).
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C. EITC
1. In General
The EITC is a refundable credit targeted to low-income tax-
payers that is based on earned income.116  It is the most redis-
tributive federal tax expenditure and reduces poverty
significantly.117  The EITC also provides an incentive for low-
income taxpayers to work because the amount of the credit
increases as earned income increases.118  As Table 2 indicates,
the credit is quite small for taxpayers with no children but
substantial for those with one or more children.119  At specified
higher levels of income, the credit diminishes and eventually
reaches zero.120  This “phase-out” feature is necessary in order
to limit the credit to low-income taxpayers, although it under-
mines the work incentive purpose of the EITC.121  The phase-
out thresholds also create a marriage penalty for certain indi-
viduals.122  In particular, two-earner couples where each
spouse earns a significant proportion of the couple’s income
are likely to face substantial loss of the EITC.123
116 See generally Kerry A. Ryan, EITC As Income (In)Stability?, 15 FLA. TAX REV.
583, 592–99 (2014) (discussing the mechanics of the EITC and its effectiveness as
a work incentive).
117 See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD & REBECCA THIESS, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT AND THE CHILD TAX CREDIT 2 (2013), http://www.epi.org/publica
tion/ib370-earned-income-tax-credit-and-the-child-tax-credit-history-purpose-
goals-and-effectiveness/ [http://perma.cc/468D-Q2D7].
118 See id. at 3.
119 See infra Table 2.
120 See HUNGERFORD & THIESS, supra note 117, at 3. R
121 See id. at 6–7.
122 See Janet Holtzblatt & Robert Rebelein, Measuring the Effect of the EITC on
Marriage Penalties and Bonuses, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1107, 1108 (2000).
123 See id. at 1119.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 32 11-JAN-16 13:16
356 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:325
TABLE 2.  2013 INCOME LIMITS FOR THE FEDERAL EITC
FOR SINGLE AND MARRIED INDIVIDUALS124
Maximum Maximum Earnings
Children Credit (Credit = 0)
Single Married
Childless $496 $14,590 $20,020
One Child $3,305 $38,511 $43,941
Two Children $5,460 $43,756 $49,186
Three or More Children $6,143 $46,997 $52,247
As the following chart indicates, couples with children and
low-to-moderate income levels, where both individuals
contribute substantial earnings, are likely to incur an EITC
marriage penalty.  If they marry, their combined earnings will
move them into the EITC phase-out range, and they will lose
much of the EITC that they would be able to claim as single
filers.
FIGURE 1.  EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN
AND FILING STATUS, 2014125
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124 2014 EITC Income Limits, Maximum Credit Amounts and Tax Law Updates,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/Credits-&-Deductions/
Individuals/Earned-Income-Tax-Credit/EITC-Income-Limits-Maximum-Credit-
Amounts [http://perma.cc/FM2Z-EECK ] (last updated July 31, 2015).
125 See infra Figure 1; Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters, 1975–2015, TAX
POLICY CTR. (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayfact
.cfm?Docid=36 [http://perma.cc/P4DS-J6FB].
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2. Women in Same-Sex Marriages: More Likely to Incur
an EITC Marriage Penalty
The following example illustrates who is most likely to in-
cur an EITC marriage penalty:
Example 4: EITC Marriage Penalty
In 2013, Kim, who has one child and $16,000 of earned
income, and Maria, who has no children and $25,000 of
earned income, got married.  If they had not married, Kim
would have received a tax refund of $4,250 and Maria would
have had a tax liability of $1,804, for a combined net refund
of $2,446.  However, as married taxpayers, their combined
earnings put them into the EITC phase-out range and they
lose most of the EITC.  Their total tax liability is $347.  Kim
and Maria incur a marriage penalty of $2,793.126
Kim and Maria’s combined net refund (filing as
single taxpayers): $(2,446)
Kim & Maria’s tax liability (filing married): $347
Marriage Penalty $2,793
Referring to Figure 1 above, Kim, a single mother with one
child and earnings of $16,000, would fall on the line labeled
“Single, 1 Child,” and she would be eligible for an EITC of about
$3,250.  If she were to marry Maria, they would move to the line
labeled “Married, 1 Child,” and with combined earnings of
$41,000, they would be eligible for an EITC of only $349.
Demographic data show that women in same-sex couples
are disproportionately represented in the group of taxpayers
who incur the EITC marriage penalty.127  They are more likely
to be low-income128 and more likely to contribute relatively
126 This example is based on one found in Elaine Maag, Marriage Penalties—
The Dilemma for Low-Income Parents, SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY AND OPPORTUNITY (May
28, 2013), http://www.spotlightonpoverty.org/ExclusiveCommentary.aspx?id=
594ef2af-dc11-4c05-8144-1f9060e46131 [http://perma.cc/DBT8-2GDC].
Further details for the computation of Kim and Maria’s taxes are as follows:
Kim (and one child) Maria Kim & Maria
(filing singly) (filing singly) (filing married)
Earnings $16,000 $25,000 $41,000
Tax Before Credits 0 1,804 1,700
EITC -3,250 — -353
Child Tax Credit -1,000 — -1,000
Total Tax Liability - 4,250 1,804 347
127 See infra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. R
128 See infra notes 134–41 and accompanying text. R
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equal amounts to household income.129  However, they are not
more likely to have children.130
Fewer same-sex female couples have children than differ-
ent-sex couples.  Gary Gates analyzed data from a 2012 Gallup
Daily Tracking Survey and the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011
American Community Survey (ACS), and found that 19% of
same-sex couple households included children under age
18.131  This percentage breaks down further to 27% of female
same-sex couples and nearly 11% of male same-sex couples.132
By comparison, among different-sex couples, the proportion
with children under age 18 was 43.5% in 2011.133
Although female same-sex couples are not as likely to have
children, they are more likely than different-sex married
couples to be at or near the poverty line.  Analyzing data from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2010 American Community Survey,
Lee Badgett, Laura Durson, and Alyssa Schneebaum found
that among female same-sex couples, the proportion of those
who are poor (below the federal poverty line) was significantly
higher than for different-sex married couples, 7.6% versus
5.7%, respectively.134  Relatedly, they also found that children
129 See supra notes 33–44 and accompanying text. R
130 See infra note 132 and accompanying text. R
131 See Gary J. Gates, WILLIAMS INST., LGBT PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(2013).
132 See id.
133 See GATES, supra note 32, at 5. R
Relatedly, all LGBT women (whether partnered or not) were as likely as non-
LGBT women to have children under the age of 18 at home (about 32% for both
groups), according to a 2012 Gallup survey.  See Gary J. Gates & Frank Newport,
Special Report: 3.4% of Adults Identify as LGBT, GALLUP (Oct. 18, 2012), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/158066/special-report-adults-identify-lgbt.aspx [http://
perma.cc/5UPS-GRZU].  In contrast, LGBT men were about half as likely as non-
LGBT men to have children in their homes, 16% versus 31%, respectively. See id.
134 See M.V. LEE BADGETT, LAURA E. DURSON & ALYSSA SCHNEEBAUM, WILLIAMS
INST., NEW PATTERNS OF POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL COMMUNITY 7
(2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGB-Pover
ty-Update-Jun-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/3TVE-TRJ7].  Due to the limitations of
the ACS source data, Badgett, Durson, and Schneebaum include both married
and unmarried couples in their categories of male and female same-sex couples,
which precludes a direct comparison between married versus unmarried differ-
ent-sex and same-sex couples. See id.
A predecessor study analyzing 2000 ACS data found similar differences be-
tween poverty rates of female same-sex couples and different-sex married
couples, 6.9% versus 5.4% respectively.  See RANDY ALBELDA, M.V. LEE BADGETT,
ALYSSA SCHNEEBAUM & GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN, GAY,
AND BISEXUAL COMMUNITY 5 (2009), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-con
tent/uploads/Albelda-Badgett-Schneebaum-Gates-LGB-Poverty-Report-March-
2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/47Z4-U2B2]; see also Anastasia H. Prokos & Jennifer
Reid Keene, Poverty Among Cohabiting Gay and Lesbian, and Married and Cohab-
iting Heterosexual Families, 31 J. FAM. ISSUES 934, 944 (2010) (finding a higher
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 35 11-JAN-16 13:16
2016] THE NOT-SO-MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR 359
in female same-sex couples had significantly higher poverty
rates than children in married different-sex couples, 19.2%
versus 12.1%, respectively.135
Other findings of Badgett, Durson, and Schneebaum pre-
sent a more ambiguous picture about poverty rates of women
in same-sex couples relative to other groups.  For example,
when they used a low-income metric instead of a poverty met-
ric, they found female same-sex couples and married different-
sex couples to be at the same level, about 18%.136  Further-
more, they found that unmarried different-sex couples have the
highest poverty rates of all, compared to married different-sex
couples, male same-sex couples, and female same-sex
couples.137  Similarly, they also found the highest poverty rates
for children of unmarried different-sex couples, as compared to
married different-sex couples, male same-sex couples, and fe-
male same-sex couples.138
TABLE 3.  INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES BY TAXABLE INCOME,
2014; POVERTY RATES OF WOMEN IN SAME-SEX COUPLES
RELATIVE TO OTHER GROUPS
Married Unmarried Male Female
Different Sex Different Sex Same Sex Same Sex
Percent of
5.7 14.1 4.3 7.6
Poor Couples
Percent of
Poor Children
12.1 29.8 23.4 19.2
in Coupled
Families
Why poverty rates are so high for unmarried different-sex
couples and their children is a complex question.  It is due at
least in part to the marriage penalties imposed by the EITC and
absolute poverty rate for same-sex female couples as compared to different-sex
married couples using 2000 ACS data, 12% versus 6%, respectively).
135 See BADGETT, DURSON & SCHNEEBAUM, supra note 134, at 8.  The predeces- R
sor study analyzing 2000 ACS data found similar higher poverty rates for children
in female same-sex couples versus children in married different-sex couples,
19.7% versus 9.4%, respectively.  See ALBELDA, BADGETT, SCHNEEBAUM & GATES,
supra note 134, at 6. R
136 See BADGETT, DURSON & SCHNEEBAUM, supra note 134, at 7.  They define R
low-income couples to be those with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty
rate. See id.
137 See id.; cf. Prokos & Keene, supra note 134, at 947 (finding that gay and R
lesbian families with children are more likely than different-sex married couples
with children to be poor but less likely than cohabiting different-sex couples with
children to be poor).
138 See BADGETT, DURSON & SCHNEEBAUM, supra note 134, at 8. R
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other disincentives to marriage in the tax-transfer system,
such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) (food stamps) and Medicaid.139  When faced with these
penalties, many poor couples will choose not to marry:
Not getting married is the major tax shelter for low- and
moderate-income households with children. In many low-in-
come communities around the nation, marriage is now the
exception rather than the rule. . . .  Our tax and welfare
system thus favors those who consider marriage an option—
to be avoided when there are penalties and engaged when
there are bonuses.  The losers tend to be those who consider
marriage vows sacred.140
The extent to which couples like Kim and Maria in the
example above will choose not to marry in order to avoid mar-
riage penalties of the tax-transfer system has not yet been
studied.  However, according to Badgett, Durson, and
Schneebaum, women in same-sex relationships are “signifi-
cantly more likely to be in poverty, indicating that lesbian
couples—who combine two low women’s incomes—are at par-
ticular risk of economic difficulty.”141  What this means is that
women in same-sex relationships will either incur EITC mar-
riage penalties more frequently than different-sex couples or be
deterred from marriage in greater numbers than different-sex
couples.142
139 See JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 113–23 (2006); MELISSA
S. KEARNEY & LESLEY J. TURNER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, GIVING SECONDARY EARNERS A
TAX BREAK: A PROPOSAL TO HELP LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME FAMILIES 1, 9–11 (2013);
Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steuerle, The Hefty Penalty on Marriage Facing Many
Households with Children, 15 FUTURE CHILD 157, 159–61 (2005); Stacy Dickert-
Conlin & Scott Houser, Taxes and Transfers: A New Look at the Marriage Penalty,
51 NAT’L TAX J. 175, 197–98 (1998); Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Hoynes,
Explaining the Fall and Rise in the Tax Cost of Marriage: The Effect of Tax Law and
Demographic Trends, 1984–97, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 683, 710 (2000);  Bruce D. Meyer,
The Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Recent Reforms, in 24 TAX POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 153, 170 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed., 2010).
140 Labor Force Participation, Taxes, and the Nation’s Social Welfare System:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Cong.
4–5 (2013) (statement of C. Eugene Steuerle, Urban Institute).
141 See BADGETT, DURSON & SCHNEEBAUM, supra note 134, at 24. R
142 The increased likelihood that female same-sex couples will face EITC mar-
riage penalties is borne out by other research indicating that female same-sex
couples are more likely to be two-earner couples with relatively equal incomes.
See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.  It is precisely this type of couple R
that encounters the highest EITC marriage penalty. See Carasso & Steuerle,
supra note 139, at 158, 164; KEARNEY & TURNER, supra note 139, at 9–10; David R
John Marotta, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Punishes Marriage, FORBES (Jan.
20, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2013/01/20/
earned-income-tax-credit-eitc-punishes-marriage/ [http://perma.cc/8NVY-
DRZM].
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In sum, demographic statistics and sociological research
relating to income levels, wealth holdings, child rearing, and
employment patterns of women in same-sex couples as com-
pared to people in different-sex couples suggest that women in
same-sex couples will: (1) be more likely to incur penalties and
less likely to receive bonuses under the income tax joint return;
(2) will be less likely to receive the benefits of the estate tax
marital deduction, gift splitting, and QTIP trust; and (3) will be
more likely to incur marriage penalties under the EITC.  The
next Part situates the tax treatment of women in same-sex
marriages within a broader critique of the taxation of marriage.
II
HISTORY AND FICTION IN THE TAX TREATMENT OF
MARRIED PEOPLE
This Part first provides a historical context for the enact-
ment of the joint return and the marital deduction and QTIP
trust rules.  It describes how these fundamental changes to the
tax law—which provided preferential tax treatment to tradi-
tional marriages in which the husband was the dominant
earner of income and owner of wealth—were politically moti-
vated to quell a rising state law movement toward stronger
marital property rights for women.  This Part then analyzes
how the fiction of marital unity served as the principal policy
rationale for these major changes in the taxation of married
people.  It argues that this specious fiction, which has grown in
stature to become a first principal of taxation in the eyes of
many scholars, obscures inequities and irrationalities in the
taxation of married people and impedes reasoned policy analy-
sis and legal reform.
A. Historical Context
1. The Joint Return
Congress enacted the modern joint return in 1948 to elimi-
nate the disparate tax treatment of married couples in commu-
nity property versus common law states.143  This disparity had
143 See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Saving Seaborn: Ownership Not Marriage as the
Basis of Family Taxation, 86 IND. L.J. 1459, 1516–18 (2011).  Although a married
couple could file a joint return prior to 1948, there was generally no advantage to
this because joint returns were subject to the same rate schedule as individuals’
returns.  In fact, it was often more advantageous for husband and wife to file
separately. See id. at 1466–71.
The story of how we came to adopt the joint return is well known, though it
never ceases to engage and entertain tax students and scholars. See generally
Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
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arisen as a result of two Supreme Court decisions, Poe v. Sea-
born144 and Lucas v. Earl.145  Under Poe v. Seaborn, income
earned by a husband in a community property state was taxed
half to him and half to his wife.146  The Court reasoned that
community property income vested in the marital unit, not
with the individual spouse who earned it, and that therefore,
half of it belonged to each spouse.147  The effect of this treat-
ment, which has come to be called “income splitting,” was that
each spouse’s putative half of the income received the benefit of
progressing through the lower tax brackets of the tax rate
structure.148
In contrast, married couples residing in common-law
states were not permitted to income split, their attempts to do
so having been disallowed in Lucas v. Earl.149  In Earl, a mar-
ried couple, Guy and Ella Earl, entered into a contract under
which Guy assigned half of his future income to Ella.  The
Court held that all of the income first vested in the husband
and was therefore fully taxable to him.150  Thus, if a married
couple had only one earner, as was typically the case at the
time, his income would be allowed only one progression
through the lower tax brackets.151  Although Lucas v. Earl dis-
allowed contractual income splitting between a husband and
wife, husbands in common law states used other devices, such
as family partnerships and trusts, to shift income to their
1399–1414 (1975) (detailing the development of the joint tax return); Jones, supra
note 9, at 292–96 (arguing that changing gender roles influenced the development R
of the joint tax return); Kahng, Fiction in Tax, supra note 9, at 26–32 (describing R
legal fictions in tax, particularly the fiction of marital unity); McMahon, supra note
9, at 727–38 (noting that tax avoidance by married couples under both commu- R
nity and common law systems during the Great Depression and World War II
served as the impetus for the development of the joint tax return); Ventry, supra
(tracing the development of the principle that ownership, rather than marriage,
determines federal taxation of families).
144 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
145 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
146 See Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 118.
I refer to men as earners and wealth holders in this historical account be-
cause men were the dominant earners of income and holders of wealth during this
time period. See Jones, supra note 9, at 262–65. R
147 See Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 117–18.
148 See Jones, supra note 9, at 266–67. R
149 See Earl, 281 U.S. at 114–15.
150 See id.
151 See Kahng, Fiction in Tax, supra note 9, at 26–27. R
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wives.152  The IRS often challenged these devices as sham
transactions and aggressively litigated these cases.153
Common law states, in order to obtain for their residents
the favorable income splitting treatment enjoyed by married
couples in community property states, began to switch to com-
munity property regimes under which husbands and wives had
equal ownership in marital property.154  At the same time, the
estate tax treatment of community property and common law
married couples was also in flux, as discussed below.155
In 1948, Congress put an end to the so-called turmoil cre-
ated by states switching to community property laws and
adopted the joint return rate structure, setting the amount for
each tax bracket at double the amount for individual re-
turns.156  As a result, all couples, whether in community prop-
erty or common law states, got the benefits of income
splitting.157
The 1948 law eliminated the disparate treatment of mar-
ried couples across the states by reducing taxes for married
couples in common law states.158  However, it also left unmar-
ried taxpayers—including sympathetic widows, widowers, and
others who supported families—with disproportionately heavy
tax burdens.159  To address these concerns, in 1951 Congress
added a new filing status—head of household—for unmarried
taxpayers with dependents, with bracket amounts roughly
152 See Jones, supra note 9, at 274–93; McMahon, supra note 9, at 729–34. R
153 See Revenue Revisions 1947–48: Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means on Community Property and Family Partnerships, 80th Cong. 846, 867–69
(1947) [hereinafter 1947 Hearings].
154 Oklahoma, Oregon, Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and the Territory
of Hawaii all enacted community property regimes. See SPECIAL TAX STUDY, COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REVENUE REVISION, 1947–48, at 1,
12 (1947) [hereinafter Special Report].  All repealed their community property
laws after the tax legislation of 1948 described below.
155 See infra section II.A.2.
156 See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301–03, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
157 See Ventry, supra note 143, at 1517–18. R
158 See id.
159 For detailed accounts of the politics and legislative activity following the
1948 adoption of the joint return, see generally Toni Robinson & Mary Moers
Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8
VA. TAX REV. 773, 781–87 (1989) (arguing that the use of marital status to define
taxpayers leads to disparate treatment of widows, widowers, and unmarried indi-
viduals); Ventry, supra note 143 (arguing that ownership of income and property, R
rather than marriage, determines tax liability); Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Some-
thing About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 33–39
(2000) (comparing income tax treatment among single-earner married couples,
two-earner married couples, and unmarried taxpayers).
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halfway between those for single and joint return filers.160  This
left only one group to pay disproportionately high taxes: single
taxpayers, whose taxes ranged from 20% to 40% higher than
that of an equivalent joint filing couple.161  In 1969, Congress
cut their taxes, too, by capping their taxes at 20% higher than
the taxes paid by equivalent joint filing couples.162
The effect of these changes was to create a mix of marriage
bonuses and penalties that we see today.  Prior to 1969, mar-
ried couples never paid more than a comparable unmarried
couple, and sometimes paid less.163  However, the 1969 law,
when it ameliorated the tax burden on single filers, for the first
time imposed a higher tax on a married couple than on an
unmarried couple with the same combined income.164  Thus,
after 1969, a married couple sometimes paid less, or some-
times paid more, than an unmarried couple with comparable
income—the creation of marriage bonuses or penalties.
2. The Marital Deduction and QTIP Trust
Congress also amended the estate tax in 1948 to address a
disparity between community property and common law re-
sidents in the taxation of spousal wealth transfers.165  Here,
again, husbands in community property states had enjoyed an
advantage: if, for example, a decedent bequeathed his entire
estate to his widow, his estate was taxed on only half of the
community property transferred to her because she was
deemed already to own the other half.166  In contrast, the estate
of a common law decedent was taxed on the entire amount of
property bequeathed to his widow.167
Congress first tried to eliminate the disparity between com-
munity property and common law residents in 1942 by in-
creasing the tax on community property residents.  It enacted a
provision requiring most community property to be taxed en-
160 See Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521. 301, 65 Stat. 452, I.R.C. § 1(b).
161 See Robinson & Wenig, supra note 159, at 783. R
162 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487,
678–85.
163 See Bittker, supra note 143, at 1429–31. R
164 See id.
165 The gift tax follows a parallel history with the estate tax, but is omitted for
the sake of simplicity.
166 See, e.g., Estate of Lee v. Comm’r, 111 T.C. 141, 145 (1948) (finding that
decedent had a one-half interest in the community property).
167 See Reduction of Individual Income Taxes: Hearings on H.R. 4790 Before the
S. Comm. on Finance, 80th Cong. 23 (1948) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (state-
ment of John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury).
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tirely in the estate of the first spouse to die.168  Community
property residents complained that the increase caused hard-
ships and inequities and the reform was short lived.169  In
1948, Congress repealed the 1942 provision and in its place
enacted a marital deduction.170
The new marital deduction permitted common law dece-
dents to transfer up to one-half of their property to the surviv-
ing spouse tax free, thus reducing the estate tax burden on
common law residents and equalizing it with that of commu-
nity property residents.171  The deduction was designed to
mimic the prior law’s treatment of community property re-
sidents, who were required to pay tax on only half the estate, on
the theory that their wives already owned the other half.172
The 1948 marital deduction applied only to outright trans-
fers.173  Transfers in trust—those in which the wife had an
income interest that would terminate after some period of
time—generally did not qualify for the deduction unless the
wife was given control over the ultimate disposition of the trust
property.174  Significantly, dower transfers—those in which the
168 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 402(b), 56 Stat. 798, 942
(amending § 118(e) of the 1939 Code) (repealed 1948).
169 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 167, at 337 (statement of J. P. R
Jackson, representing State Rights Association of Houston, Texas); Revenue Revi-
sions, 1947–48: Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means on Community
Property and Family Partnerships, 80th Cong. 776–93 (1947) (statements of
Charles E. Dunbar, Jr. and John G. Wisdom, attorneys for the Louisiana Commu-
nity Property Taxpayers Committee).
170 See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 351, 62 Stat. 110, 116–17.
171 See id.
172 See S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 27–28 (1948).
Under prior law, a husband in a community property state would be taxed on
only half the marital estate bequeathed to his wife, on the theory that the wife
already owned the other half. See, e.g., Estate of Lee v. Comm’r, 11 T. C. 141,
144–45 (1948).  In contrast, a husband in a common law state would be taxed on
the entire estate. See Senate Hearings, supra note 167, at 26 (statement of John R
W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury).
In 1942, the estate tax took a brief detour from the prior law described in the
preceding paragraph when Congress equalized the estate tax treatment of com-
munity property and common law residents by taxing the entire estate be-
queathed by a community property husband to wife.  Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L.
No. 77-753, § 402(b), 56 Stat. 798, 942 (amending § 118(e) of the 1939 Code)
(repealed 1948).  Obviously, community property residents were not happy with
this solution and complained that it was unfair. See, e.g., 1947 Hearings, supra
note 153, at 776–93 (statements of Charles E. Dunbar, Jr. and John G. Wisdom, R
attorneys for the Louisiana Community Property Taxpayers Committee); Senate
Hearings, supra, note 167, at 337 (statement of J. P. Jackson, representing State R
Rights Association of Houston, Texas).
173 See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168 § 361, 62 Stat. 110, 117–18.
174 See id. at 118.  This limitation is codified today at I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5)
(2015).
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wife received only an income interest for life and the decedent
husband designated the ultimate recipients of the trust prop-
erty upon his wife’s death—did not meet this requirement and
were not deductible.175
The new marital deduction thus created an incentive for
decedents to transfer property outright to the surviving spouse
and a disincentive for them to use the customary transfer in
trust in which the surviving spouse received only an income
interest.  Then Treasury Secretary John W. Snyder, who op-
posed the marital deduction, pointed out these incentive
effects:
Since it is a frequent practice in common-law States for a
wealthy husband to give his wife a life interest in his estate
with remainders to his children or other beneficiaries, equal-
ity of treatment [between community property and common-
law residents] would be achieved only by interfering to a large
extent with this long-established pattern of family
dispositions.176
Despite the marital deduction’s “immediate and star-
tling”177 disruption to customary wealth transfer patterns, it
seems that most lawmakers overlooked or simply did not un-
derstand its estate planning implications.  As Stanley Surrey,
then Tax Legislative Counsel for the Treasury Department,
observed:
[T]he splitting of estates and gifts simply rode in unheralded
and uninspected on the coattails of splitting of income.  . . .
The impact upon estate planning, upon the disposition of
property within the family, is immediate and startling.  Yet on
passage of the Act, only a relative handful of attorneys close
to the theater of operations even approached awareness of
what these provisions involve, and it will be many months or
even years before operative understanding of all of their
ramifications is achieved by tax practitioners.178
Once practitioners learned of the new law, they were horri-
fied to realize that the marital deduction in effect created an
anti-dower incentive.  Their commentary is a revealing admix-
ture of condescending and mistrustful attitudes toward wo-
men, seasoned with castration imagery:
175 See id. For a history of dower transfers and their continued use in modern
estate planning, see Fellows, supra note 9, at 146–59. R
176 Senate Hearings, supra note 167, at 26 (statement of John W. Snyder). R
177 Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family—The Revenue Act of
1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1117 (1948).
178 Id.
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The wife must be given absolute control, either during her life
or by her will; in either event she may (foolishly perhaps) cut
off the objects of his bounty and leave his estate to a gigolo
second husband.179
Even where the [power of appointment trust] (rather than
outright bequest) is used, the wife’s unrestricted power of
appointment can be a source of great personal power.  The
[husband’s designated beneficiaries] can be cut off by a
stroke of mother’s testamentary pen.180
In general, property relieved of taxation in the estate of the
spouse first to die will be taxed in the estate of the survivor—
and will be subject to the unfettered disposition of the survi-
vor in the meantime.  For many people this power of disposi-
tion will be too high a price to pay . . . .181
The tax law should not offer a premium to a husband who
ignores his better judgment and grants his widow a general
power of appointment leaving his children at the mercy of any
charlatan who has his widow’s ear.182
Eventually, in 1981, Congress remedied the inadvertent
disincentive for dower transfers.183  The Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) made two major changes to the marital
deduction.  First, it made deduction unlimited in amount, elim-
inating the 1948 restriction that limited the deduction to half
the decedent’s wealth.184 Second, it made dower transfers de-
ductible in the decedent’s estate under a new deduction for a
qualified terminable interest in property (QTIP).185  The new
QTIP rules also provided that property in a QTIP trust would be
taxed in the widow’s estate, even though she would not control
the disposition of the trust property upon her death.186
179 Charles Looker, The Impact of Estate and Gift Taxes on Property Disposi-
tions, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 44, 62 (1950).
180 Id. at 67.
181 John J. Waldron, Implications of the Marital Deduction, 87 TR. & EST. 523,
523 (1948).
182 John W. Beveridge, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction—Beneficent Intent,
Baneful Result, 44 TAXES 283, 284 (1966).
183 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.  For a
detailed history and analysis of the QTIP provisions, see Gerzog, supra note 9, at R
306–18.
184 See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2012).
185 See id. § 2056(b)(7).
186 See id. § 2044.
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B. The Fiction of Marital Unity187
1. The Joint Return
The 1948 adoption of income splitting under the joint re-
turn rested on a fiction that all married couples shared their
income.  Stated another way, a married couple was treated as
an irreducible economic unit, and the individual rights of hus-
band and wife to marital income and property were deemed
irrelevant.  Once this fiction was adopted, it seemed logical to
conclude that married couples with equal amounts of income
should pay equal amounts of tax.  It simply did not matter that
husbands and wives had differing rights to the income depend-
ing on whether they resided in community property or common
law states.
Clearly, the immediate political goal in Congress’s adoption
of this fiction was to reduce tax liability for husbands residing
in common law states.188  Income splitting was also beneficial
from a policy perspective.  It eliminated the disruption of com-
mon law states switching to community property regimes.  It
also removed the incentive for residents of common law states
to use devices, such as partnerships and trusts, to shift income
to their spouses.  Both the Report of the House Committee on
Ways and Means and the Report of the Senate Committee on
Finance cite these two benefits as the reasons for Congress’s
adoption of income splitting.189  Neither report, however, men-
tions the costs of income splitting.  One cost was that income
splitting mismeasured income to the extent that it ignored the
differing economic rights allocated to husbands and wives
under differing state property law regimes.190  Another cost
was its effect on married women’s property rights: income split-
ting eliminated the political pressure on common law states to
provide married women with the stronger property rights of a
community property regime.191
The Special Tax Study Committee, which recommended
that the Ways and Means Committee adopt income splitting,
brushed aside the importance of women’s marital property
rights as insignificant:
187 The following account is based on Kahng, Fiction in Tax, supra note 9. R
188 See SPECIAL TAX STUDY COMM. TO THE H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 80TH
CONG., REVENUE REVISION, 1947-48 35, 40 (1947) [hereinafter Minority Report]
(describing the joint return as a “poorly disguised measure” to relieve high-income
groups).
189 S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 23–24 (1948); H.R. REP. NO. 80-1274, at 22–23
(1948).
190 See Jones, supra note 9, at 295. R
191 See id.
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The fact that the legal rights of [a man’s] wife under the State
law may differ . . . does not seem to justify the significant
differences in Federal income taxes payable.  There has come
to be rather, general agreement that spouses with similar
incomes should pay similar Federal taxes, no matter where
they live.192
The reasoning of the Special Tax Study Committee is spe-
cious.  Rather than recognizing the fiction of treating all mar-
ried couples as if they shared their income, the Committee
relied upon the fiction to trivialize the differing allocations of
rights between husband and wife under common law and com-
munity property.  By defining the policy goal as equal treat-
ment of married couples with equal income, in essence treating
each married couple as an irreducible unit, the Committee pre-
empted any consideration whatsoever of each spouse’s individ-
ual rights to marital income and property.193
As Carolyn Jones has argued, income splitting was attrac-
tive to legislators and policymakers not only because it reduced
taxes for common law residents, but also because it halted the
community property movement and defeated the advancement
of stronger property rights for married women, thereby preserv-
ing traditional gender roles and power relationships.194  The
192 Special Report, supra note 154, at 12. R
193 The Special Tax Study Committee further demonstrated the error in its
logic through its treatment of other alternatives.  The Committee viewed as infer-
ior alternatives that would have recognized the differing rights accorded to mar-
ried women in different states, not only because of the administrative costs the
alternatives would have entailed but also because they would not treat married
couples equally.  For example, the Committee considered taxing all earned income
to the earner, even in community property states, and all community property
income to the spouse who exercised management and control of the property.  As
an alternative proposal, the Committee considered reversing Lucas v. Earl so that
married couples in common law states could enter into sharing agreements that
would be recognized for tax purposes.  The Committee rejected these alternatives
as inferior to income splitting, in part because they believed the income splitting
scheme would be easier to administer. See id. However, the Committee cited
equal taxation of married couples as the most important benefit of income
splitting:
[Income splitting] eliminates the legal and administrative problems
which now arise from the many attempts to divide income between
spouses . . . .  It avoids the serious questions which would arise in
the interpretation and construction of contracts between spouses.
Most important, [income splitting] puts the incomes of husbands and
wives, wherever resident, on a like basis for Federal tax purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
194 See Jones, supra note 9, at 266, 295.  Others have argued that there was R
not an antiwoman agenda.  See Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax,
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 347 (1994) (describing the 1948 enactment of the joint
return as “essentially a historical accident”); Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical
Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521, 1574 (1998) (describing Grace
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fiction of marital unity was the vehicle by which Congress could
both justify these goals and obscure the social costs of achiev-
ing these goals.
In the aftermath of the 1948 Act, marital unity, which dur-
ing the debates had operated as a convenient fiction and served
as political camouflage, became dogma.  Stanley Surrey, then
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy, portrayed the joint
return as the product of a reasoned policy analysis, which
rightfully treated the married couple “as a [single economic]
unit.”195  By 1976, scholars had elevated marital unity to a first
principle of taxation.  According to Professor Boris Bittker, one
of the most influential tax scholars of the twentieth century,
“the 1948 statutory principle of equal taxes for equal-income
married couples has been ‘almost universally accepted’ by tax
theorists . . . .”196
The “principle of equal taxes for equal-income married
couples” led Bittker to conceptualize the taxation of married
people as a set of “insoluble dilemmas”—three ideals that can-
not be attained simultaneously: the first, horizontal equity or
couples equality—that is, taxing equal-income married couples
equally; the second, a progressive rate structure; and the third,
marriage neutrality—that is, not penalizing or rewarding the
choice to marry.197
Bittker’s framework is now the dominant one.198  It has an
internal logical consistency: it is true that the three articulated
Blumberg’s finding that “Congress did not adopt joint returns for the purpose of
discouraging married women from working”).
195 Surrey, supra note 177, at 1162. R
196 Bittker, supra note 143, at 1395 (citation omitted). R
197 Id. at 1395, 1419–20.  Bittker was not the first to explain the marriage tax
dilemma in this way, as a 1972 statement also addressed this dilemma. Tax
Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses Are Work-
ing, Hearings Before the H.R. Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong. 78–79 (1972)
(statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Ass’t Treas. Sec’y).  Nonetheless, Bittker’s article
was extremely influential, and he is the one who has become most closely identi-
fied with what I call the “Bittker framework.”
198 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 2–6 (1997) [hereinafter FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE] (noting
the impossibility of simultaneously achieving equal treatment of married couples,
marriage neutrality, and progressivity); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 451–52 (7th ed. 2013) (noting
the same); JANE G. GRAVELLE, THE MARRIAGE TAX PENALTY 52–53 (2003) (detailing
the legislative history of the marriage penalty); PAUL MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 971 (5th ed. 2004) (stating that “it is simply impossible to design
a progressive tax regime in which all married couples of equal aggregate income
are taxed equally and in which an individual’s tax liability is unaffected by
changes in marital status”); James Alm, Leslie A. Whittington & Jason Fletcher, Is
There a “Singles Tax”? The Relative Income Tax Treatment of Single Households,
PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 69, 85–86 (stating that “[i]t is well known that no tax system
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goals cannot be achieved at the same time.  However, the first
goal is circular insofar as it serves as the rationale for the joint
return.  If one begins, as Bittker does, with the proposition that
equal-income married couples ought to pay equal amounts of
tax, then one necessarily assumes that equal-income married
couples are the same in ways that matter for horizontal-equity
purposes.199
This assumption underlies the concept of income splitting
under the joint return: husband and wife are assumed to share
equally in the income produced within the marital unit, regard-
less of which spouse actually earns the income.  Pamela Gann
and Marjorie Kornhauser have interrogated the equal-sharing
assumption, and Kornhauser found that equal-income married
couples differ widely in the extent to which they pool their
income and make joint decisions about consumption.200  Con-
versely, people other than married couples—such as unmar-
ried couples and roommates—sometimes do pool resources
and make joint consumption decisions.201  Therefore, if the
joint return is premised on equal sharing, it is both over inclu-
can achieve simultaneously the goals of progressivity, marriage neutrality, and
horizontal equity across families”).
199 As scholars have noted, the whole enterprise of horizontal equity is dis-
turbingly circular.  Not only must one assume that the married couple is the
appropriate unit of comparison, one must also assume that income is the appro-
priate metric by which to determine whether two units are equally situated.  It
seems that all the difficult judgments must be made in advance of actually apply-
ing the horizontal equity criterion. See Thomas D. Griffith, Should “Tax Norms”
Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury
Recoveries, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1155–56 (arguing that horizontal equity can-
not justify tax policy); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a
Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139, 140, 148 (1989) (critiquing horizontal equity as
devoid of normative value). But see Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once
More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 116–17 (1990) (defending horizontal equity).
Anthony Infanti, in his devastating critique of equity analysis, makes a per-
suasive case for the “subtle, yet pernicious ways in which framing our tax policy
analyses in tax equity terms can shape the results of those analyses.”  Anthony C.
Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1259 (2008).  According to Infanti, one
of the several ways in which horizontal equity does this is through what he calls a
“sanitizing effect”: “Tax equity rids [the] debate of difficult discussions about race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and/or other forms of invidious
discrimination by forcing those discussions to be carried out in ostensibly ‘neu-
tral’ economic terms.” Id. at 1209.
200 See Gann, supra note 9, at 24–27 (identifying conceptual and empirical R
problems with equal sharing between spouses); Kornhauser, supra note 9, at R
87–91 (cataloguing research studies that show great variation in sharing arrange-
ments between spouses). But see Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra
note 194, at 348–55 (arguing that there is strong evidence of pooled marital R
income consumption).
201 See Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 67. R
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sive (including married couples who do not share) and under
inclusive (excluding unmarried persons who do share).202
Another important challenge to the purported “sameness”
of equal-income married couples focuses on the differences be-
tween one- and two-earner couples.203  A one-earner couple
benefits from the value of household and other unpaid services
performed by the stay-at-home spouse (imputed income) and
as a result, is better off than a comparable two-earner
couple.204  In addition, a two-earner couple incurs more in the
way of nondeductible expenses of producing income, such as
childcare, clothing, and commuting expenses, also leaving
them worse off than the one-earner couple.205  Again, the ratio-
nale for the joint return—treating equal-income couples
equally—is undermined to the extent that equal-income
couples are shown to differ in these significant ways.
An even more fundamental challenge to Bittker’s frame-
work is to question why coupled people (whether married or
not) should be treated under a separate category at all from
single people.  The obvious alternative is to treat all people
individually, and many scholars have argued for just that.206
Despite these serious challenges to the claim that equal-
income married couples ought to be taxed equally, the joint
return, along with the notion that the couple (whether married
or not) is a fundamental unit for tax purposes, remains en-
202 See Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27,
54–60 (1996) (describing the underinclusiveness of treating marriage as the only
type of economically beneficial household deserving of special tax treatment);
Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 851–53
(2008) (proposing a system in which spouses or domestic partners could opt to file
jointly or individually); Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral
Income Tax, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1540–44 (2006) (describing how a couple’s
married or unmarried status is a poor proxy for whether they share income).
203 See generally Blumberg, supra note 9 (discussing the many ways in which R
the tax law benefits single-earner married couples and disadvantages two-earner
married couples).
204 See McCaffery, Taxation and the Family, supra note 9, at 1001–05 (dis- R
cussing the nontaxation of imputed income and its effects on married couples);
Staudt, supra note 9, at 1589–99 (same). R
205 See McCaffery, Taxation and the Family, supra note 9, at 1005–10. R
206 See Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax,
and Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 747 (2013);
Gann, supra note 9, at 36–39; Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal R
Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 157 (1998); Kornhauser, supra note 9, at R
108–11; James M. Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage, Neutrality, Chil-
dren, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1409, 1434 (2010); Harvey S.
Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT’L TAX J. 423, 427–28 (1977);
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 194, at 342. R
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trenched in mainstream political and policy discourse.207  The
political and policy debate regarding the joint return has not
questioned the primacy of the couple as taxpayer, focusing
rather on whether, and to what extent, couples should suffer
marriage penalties or enjoy marriage bonuses, and who among
the universe of couples ought to be eligible for the marriage
bonus.208
2. The Marital Deduction and QTIP Trust
On the estate tax side, the fiction of marital unity produced
even more pernicious results.  As discussed above, the 1948
marital deduction inadvertently created a tax disincentive for
dower transfers, much to the dismay of estate planning practi-
tioners.209  In their eyes, the problem with the marital deduc-
tion was not that it was based on a fiction of shared wealth
between husband and wife.  Rather, it required too much real-
ity: in order to be taxed as if he shared his wealth with his wife,
a husband actually had to cede control of the wealth to her.
Completely inadvertently, the marital deduction strengthened
women’s property rights by providing a tax incentive for hus-
bands to transfer wealth to their wives.210
The fiction of marital unity ultimately provided the solution
to this “sorry mess,” as Surrey described it.211  Allan H. W.
Higgins, chairman of the American Bar Association, Section of
Taxation, Committee on Equalization of Taxes in Community-
Property and Common-Law States planted the first seeds of the
fiction.  During the 1948 Act congressional hearings, he argued
that even dower transfers should qualify for the marital deduc-
tion in the decedent’s estate, as long as they were taxed in the
widow’s estate.212  According to Higgins, the fact that the
207 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Wedded to the Joint Return: Culture and the
Persistence of the Marital Unit in the American Income Tax, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIR-
IES 631, 646–49 (2010).
208 See Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, supra note 202; Cain, Taxing Fami- R
lies Fairly, supra note 202; Motro, supra note 202; Zelenak, supra note 159, at R
34–39.  In recent years, an increasing number of academics have called for repeal
of the joint return, but most of them continue to cast their analysis in accordance
with Bittker’s framework. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 206, at 705, 728–31 (refer- R
ring to the Bittker framework as an “insoluble” problem that a system of individ-
ual filing cannot solve).
209 See supra section II.A.2.
210 Id.
211 Stanley S. Surrey, An Introduction to Revision of the Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14 (1950).
212 Senate Hearings, supra note 167, at 317 (statement of Allan H. W. Higgins, R
Chairman, American Bar Association, Tax Section, Comm. on Equalization of
Taxes in Community-Property and Common-Law States).
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widow had no control over the disposition of the trust property
was irrelevant: “It has long been the custom to protect wives by
placing property in trust.  As long as the trust property is taxed
at the death of the surviving spouse[,] the marital deduction
should apply irrespective of the varying provisions of the
trust.”213
Higgins’s claim—that transfers by a married couple to
third parties should be taxed only once, no matter which
spouse controls the transfer —was based on the fiction of mari-
tal unity.  Again, the fiction provided a basis for disregarding
the allocation of property rights between husband and wife for
tax purposes.  Higgins’s proposal tracked the logic of income
splitting.  Transfers made by husbands would be deemed to be
made by their wives as well.  In this fashion, the fiction served
to justify favorable tax treatment for transfers in which hus-
bands retained control of the ultimate disposition of their prop-
erty even after death.
Soon after the 1948 Act was passed, Surrey adopted Hig-
gins’s ideas, and explicitly clothed them in the fiction of marital
unity:
Husband and wife are regarded as a unit for income tax
purposes, and I would similarly regard them as a unit for
transfer tax purposes.  There would be no tax as long as the
enjoyment of property shifted from one to the other within
this unit.  The transfer tax would apply only when property
left this unit and passed to the children or others.  The unit
would cease to exist on death of the surviving spouse.214
Surrey stated his view in neutral, if conclusory, terms: the
married couple is a unit, and property should be taxed only
upon transfer from the unit to a third party.  However, two
years later, in 1950, Surrey revealed his true concerns:
Basically the sorry mess we now face resulted from the illicit
alliance in 1948 of transfer tax reduction and community
property concepts.  . . .  The husband has to choose between
obtaining tax savings through releasing his hand from the
control of the property on his wife’s death and the risk that
when she dies some alien hand will be guiding her
actions.215
The fiction of marital unity enabled Surrey to disguise his
fears that a purportedly untrustworthy or incompetent widow,
213 Id. at 316.
214 Surrey, supra note 177, at 1162. R
215 Surrey, supra note 211, at 14. R
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guided by an “alien hand” would acquire control of her hus-
band’s wealth.216
The 1981 enactment of ERTA actualized Surrey and Hig-
gins’ vision for the marital deduction.  As discussed above,
ERTA made the marital deduction unlimited in amount and
enacted the QTIP trust rules.217  The legislative history of these
provisions explains them by reference to marital unity: all
transfers within the unit should be exempt, without any limita-
tion on the amount of transfers.218  Transfers by the marital
unit to others should be taxed only once, when the property
leaves the marital unit.219  ERTA engrafted the income tax fic-
tion of marital unity to the estate tax: “The committee believes
that a husband and wife should be treated as one economic
unit for purposes of estate and gift taxes, as they generally are
for income tax purposes.  Accordingly, no tax should be im-
posed on transfers between a husband and wife.”220
After ERTA, the estate tax fiction of marital unity quickly
became orthodoxy among tax academics.
All quantitative limitations on the marital deduction were
removed because “a husband and wife should be treated as
one economic unit for purposes of the estate and gift taxes.”
. . .  The QTIP provision is a natural extension of the [marital
deduction] given the shift in emphasis from mimicking com-
munity property to taxing property only once each
generation.221
Viewed broadly, the unlimited marital deduction has the ef-
fect of treating spouses as a single taxpayer with a lifetime
equal to the survivor’s.  In this light, the transfer of a life
interest from one spouse to the other can be regarded as the
retention of a life interest by this notional taxpayer.222
216 Id.
217 See supra section II.A.2.
218 S. REP. NO. 144, 97-144, at 127 (1981); H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 159
(1981); STAFF ON J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 233 (Comm. Print 1981).
219 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, supra note 218, at 160; STAFF ON J. COMM. ON R
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., supra note 218, at 234. R
220 S. REP. NO. 97-144, supra note 218, at 127. R
221 Howard E. Abrams, A Reevaluation of the Terminable Interest Rule, 39 TAX
L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1983).
222 Joseph Isenbergh, Simplifying Retained Life Interests, Revocable Transfers,
and the Marital Deduction, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 32 (1984) (emphasis omitted).
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The substantive effect of . . . [the 1981] changes is to treat the
marital unit as a separate transfer tax unit with respect to
interspousal transfers.223
In contrast to the academic explanations for the new law,
practitioners were quick to point out the true purpose of the
QTIP rules; they eliminated the tax disincentive for dower
transfers inadvertently created by the 1948 marital deduction
and enabled husbands to reap the benefit of the marital deduc-
tion while retaining dead hand control of their wealth:
[E]liminated is the nagging anxiety that the surviving spouse
will remarry and . . . divert the marital deduction property
from the natural objects of the decedent’s bounty.224
It is no longer necessary for a testator to make the difficult
decision of whether to take advantage of the marital deduc-
tion for his estate and give up control over the final disposi-
tion of his property or forego the marital deduction and
maintain control.  Formerly, . . . and a more painful prospect,
it was not possible for a testator to ensure that the marital
deduction property would not end up in the hands of his
successor, if the surviving spouse decided to remarry.225
[T]he QTIP trust is attractive to many clients who want to
“handcuff” the surviving spouse while at the same time quali-
fying for the marital deduction.226
In her critique of how the law of wills and trusts relegates
women to the role of a vessel for patrilineal wealth transmis-
sion, Mary Louise Fellows observes that the QTIP rules are
“especially revealing of the patriarchy’s subversion of married
223 Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfers After ERTA, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1183, 1220–21 (1983).
224 Jeffrey Pennell, Estate Tax Marital Deduction, 239-4th TAX MGMT. EST. GIFTS
& TR. J. (BNA), at A-58(3) (1990).
225 The Uses of a QTIP Trust, 1 TAX IDEAS § 422 (1990).
Today, estate planners continue to promote the QTIP trust as a way to hand-
cuff the surviving spouse, as Jeffrey Pennell observes in this candid assessment of
the reasons for the QTIP trust:
If you think back, QTIP was enacted in 1981, along with adoption of
the unlimited marital deduction, I believe because men like mem-
bers of the House Ways and Means Committee that crafted this
legislation did not want their widows to have control over that much
of their estates.  And didn’t . . . [the estate planning community]
embrace QTIP predominantly because of its “handcuff” nature?
Jeffrey N. Pennell, It’s Not Your Father’s Buick, Anymore: Estate Planning for the
Next Generation(s) of Client, 43 INST. ON EST. PLAN., 13-1, 13-17 (2009).  Pennell
goes on to speculate that the desire to handcuff wives is much less prevalent
among younger men.  He speculates that the estate planners, many of whom are
from the “GI generation,” are out of step with the times. Id. at 13-17 to 13-21.
226 Pennell, supra note 224, at A-42. R
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women’s property rights.”227  Similarly, Wendy Gerzog finds the
rules “can only be explained as a gender-biased, paternalistic,
and degrading treatment of women.”228  The fiction of marital
unity disguises the pernicious effects of the QTIP rules de-
scribed by these scholars.  Taxing a wealth transfer only when
it left the marital unit seems a justifiable result only because
the fiction obscures the “handcuff” worn by the wife.
The fiction of marital unity—that a married couple is a
single economic unit—has evolved into a first principle of taxa-
tion that is foundational to both the income tax joint return
and the estate tax marital deduction and related provisions.  In
both cases, it provides the justification for a tax regime that
privileges a certain type of marriage, in which spousal roles are
both gendered and hierarchical.  The next Part considers how
the introduction of a new group of married taxpayers—same-
sex wives—can help disrupt the hidebound orthodoxies of mar-
riage taxation and lead to meaningful reform.
III
ASSESSMENT AND REFORMS
This final Part assesses the tax treatment of women in
same-sex marriages in the context of the account of the histori-
cal and conceptual underpinnings of marriage taxation, devel-
oped in the previous Part.  That account both explains and
gives credence to my prediction in Part I that the women in
same-sex marriage will be taxed disadvantageously relative to
people in different-sex marriages.  The tax treatment of mar-
riage developed during a time when husbands were the domi-
nant breadwinners and wealth holders and wives were
homemakers.229  Political and social forces of the time, fortified
by flawed policy rationales based on the legal fiction of marital
unity, led to laws that favor this model of marriage.230  Today,
the tax law continues to reward this anachronistic model of
marriage and to penalize other, more egalitarian models of
marriage.  The effects of this on women in same-sex marriages
are both predictable and profound.
227 Fellows, supra note 9, at 158. R
228 Gerzog, supra note 9, at 305; see also Dodge, supra note 67, at 1734–35 R
(stating that “[t]here is no doubt that the QTIP device diminishes the autonomy of
wives and widows” and remarking upon “the enormous constraints imposed by
the QTIP trust on women’s control of wealth”).
229 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. R
230 See supra subpart II.B.
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With respect to income tax, the fictional notion of marital
unity supports the specious claim that married couples with
equal incomes should be taxed equally, and that therefore we
should aggregate two spouses’ income and tax it under a joint
return.  The analysis of women in same-sex marriages shows
how this “equal” treatment in fact rewards one type of mar-
riage—the traditional, single-earner model of marriage—and
penalizes another type of marriage—an egalitarian model of
marriage in which both spouses participate in the labor force.
The joint return rewards marriages like Ward and June’s and
Bill and Melinda’s, and penalizes marriages like Thelma and
Louise’s and Ellen and Portia’s.231
With respect to the gift and estate tax side, the fiction of
marital unity supports the seemingly reasonable proposition
that we ought not to tax wealth transfers within the marital
unit and should tax wealth only when it leaves the marital unit.
The analysis of women in same-sex marriages shows how this
seemingly reasonable proposition serves to rationalize a set of
rules that benefits a certain type of marriage—one in which
historically the husband dominated the wife through the ine-
qualities of wealth, age, and power—and provides no benefit to
couples who either own less wealth or are more equal in their
wealth holdings or share more equally in deciding how to trans-
fer their wealth.232  The most extreme illustration of this is the
QTIP trust, which benefits the “Donald Trump arrangement” of
marriage.233
The EITC illustrates a separate and serious flaw in the tax
law: it equates marriage with economic interdependence and
conversely, it assumes no economic interdependence for other
types of households.234  The tax law relies on marriage as a
proxy for economic interdependence in many provisions that
one might roughly characterize as means based, but the EITC
has the most severe impact on vulnerable populations.235  Us-
ing marriage as a proxy for economic interdependence is in-
231 See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. R
232 See supra subpart I.B.
233 See supra text accompanying notes 106–13. R
234 See Infanti, supra note 9, at 609–10; see also Martha L.A. Fineman, Mask- R
ing Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2181
(1995) (“[C]ontinued adherence to an unrealistic and unrepresentative set of as-
sumptions about the family affects the way we perceive and attempt to solve
persistent problems of poverty and social welfare.”).
235 Other means-based provisions include the child and dependent care
credit, the child tax credit, education tax credits, the adoption credit, and a
variety of other deductions and credits that phase out at higher income levels.
See CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., supra note 10, at 8–9. R
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creasingly problematic in view of today’s fluid and diverse
family formations.236
My purpose in analyzing the adverse effects of marriage
taxation on women in same-sex marriages is not to advocate for
a more equal distribution of the benefits and burdens of mar-
riage taxation among all married couples.  Rather, my purpose
is to show that equality among married couples is an illusory
goal based on the fiction of marital unity that has produced
irremediable inequities and irrationalities.237
Congress should reform the tax law to eliminate or curtail
marital status as a determinant of taxation.  By relinquishing
the fiction of marital unity, so dearly held by lawmakers,
policymakers, and scholars, we can cut through the Gordian
knot of Bittker’s “insoluble dilemma.”238  Contrary to Bittker’s
argument, married couples do not warrant equal treatment
simply because their combined tax attributes are equal.
Rather, a married couple consists of two individuals who may
resemble or differ from two other individuals who are also mar-
ried.  Same-sex wives, newly recognized as married under the
tax law, highlight the ways in which married couples may be
different—in terms of how they divide household and market
labor, make decisions, and share income and wealth.  There is
no reason to assume that all married couples would be the
same with respect to these relational parameters.  Nor is there
reason to prefer one set of parameters over another, as the
current law does.
In addition to being logically flawed, the current tax treat-
ment of married people perpetuates one model of marriage at
the expense of another.  It rewards and entrenches an anachro-
nistic, nonegalitarian model of marriage and at the same time,
penalizes and discourages a more egalitarian model.  Viewed as
a means by which the state regulates intimate relationships,239
236 See Infanti, supra note 9, at 609–10, 619. R
237 The problems are irremediable because of the choice of marital unit.  For
example, Congress could change the tax rate structure to further reduce or elimi-
nate marriage penalties for two-earner couples, but this would unavoidably in-
crease marriage bonuses for single-earner couples and would also unduly
penalize single people.  A two-earner deduction could ameliorate the first problem
but not the second problem.  Congress could remedy some of the more egregious
problems under the gift and estate tax marital deduction, by, for example, repeal-
ing the QTIP trust rules, but this would not alter the inherent bias the marital
deduction in favor of couples with unequal wealth holdings.
238 Bittker, supra note 143, at 1419. R
239 See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and
the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 472–76
(1996).  Elizabeth Emens provides this succinct albeit nonexhaustive catalog of
the ways in which the state regulates through marriage:
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the tax law is a particularly powerful tool because it imposes
immediate and quantifiable economic consequences to mar-
riage.  Marrying can produce income tax bonuses of tens or
hundreds of thousands of dollars over the lives of a married
couple (even more in the case of gift and estate tax benefits),
but only if the marriage fits a certain mold.  Conversely, a mar-
riage that does not fit that mold can incur income tax penalties
of comparable magnitude.  Of course, people can choose not to
marry, but this is just another form of regulation.  Similarly,
once two people marry, the promise of marriage rewards or the
threat of marriage penalties can shape their behavior and pref-
erences, pushing them away from more egalitarian marriage
and toward more traditional marriage.
My analysis of the impact of marriage taxation on same-sex
wives cogently demonstrates the consequences of taxation-as-
regulation.  This novel group of married taxpayers, who are less
likely to conform to the privileged model of marriage, will suffer
the economic consequences of their nonconformity in the form
of fewer tax bonuses and more tax penalties.  The tax system
epitomizes why scholars such as Nancy Polikoff find the LGBT
marriage movement to be problematic; they believe marriage is
an irredeemably gendered and hierarchical institution that can
subvert LGBT relationships and stunt the development of alter-
native models of intimate relationships.240
Though state laws vary, state and federal laws affecting marriage
broadly include tax benefits and burdens for spouses; immigration
benefits; evidentiary privileges; inheritance benefits and obligations;
surrogate decision-making responsibilities; parenting presump-
tions; special forms of property ownership; various veterans’ bene-
fits; statutory privileges (such as caretaking leave time under the
Family Medical Leave Act); and a legal mechanism and default rules
for divorce, inter alia.
Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 235, 258–59 (2011).
240 See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay
and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1538–39 (1993); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and
Override Rules, 100 GEO. L. J. 1881, 1961–64 (2012) (explaining that many
progressives object to same-sex marriage because they view it as a patriarchal
institution).
In arguing for the elimination of the joint return, Anthony Infanti and Nancy
Knauer have made forceful arguments along these same lines. See Infanti, supra
note 9; Knauer, supra note 206.  Similarly, I have argued elsewhere that by R
imposing undue tax penalties on single people, the joint return undermines their
ability to forge a positive social identity.  See Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number,
supra note 9, at 684; see also Nancy Leong, Negative Identity, 88 S. CALIF. L. REV. R
1357, 1400–10 (2015) (analyzing ways in which the legal system, including tax
laws, adversely impacts atheist, asexual, single, and child-free people).
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To eliminate or curtail marital status as a basis for taxation
would entail a variety of measures, many of which other schol-
ars have developed, and a full exploration of which is beyond
the scope of this Article.  Instead, the following paragraphs
sketch the broad contours of what such a reform would look
like.
With respect to the income tax, Congress should abolish
and replace the joint return with a system of individual filing
for all taxpayers.  Such a reform would revive many of the
issues that existed before the adoption of the 1948 joint return,
such as how to take account of differences in state marital
property laws, allocate deductible expenditures between mar-
ried people, deal with property transfers between spouses, and
police avoidance behavior.241
These obstacles are not insurmountable.  Many developed
countries, which blindly followed the United States in adopting
the joint return, have since replaced it with a system of individ-
ual filing.242  The United States is one of the few developed
countries to retain the joint return.243  Anthony Infanti has
241 See Infanti, supra note 9, at 647–63; McMahon, supra note 9, at 738–46; R
Puckett, supra note 206, at 1422–24; Ventry, supra note 143, at 1466–71, R
1510–18; Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 194, at 381–401. R
242 See Edward McCaffery, Where’s the Sex in Fiscal Sociology?: Taxation and
Gender in Comparative Perspectives, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN
COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 216, 218 (Isaac William Martin et al. eds.,
2009)
243 As of 2004, only seven countries (including the United States) of the thirty-
two countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) required the joint return. See James Alm & Mikhail I. Melnick, Taxing the
“Family” in the Individual Income Tax, 5 PUB. FIN. & MGMT 67, 85 (2005); see also
FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE, supra note 198, at 59 (in 1993, nineteen out of twenty- R
seven OECD countries taxed husbands and wives separately); ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OF PERSONAL IN-
COME TAX 54–56 (2006) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] (noting that many OECD coun-
tries have moved away from family-based taxation toward individually based
systems); Joseph A. Pechman & Gary V. Engelhardt, The Income Tax Treatment of
the Family: An International Perspective, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 1, 7–10 (1990) (identifying
a “world-wide trend” toward individual filing and away from joint filing).
Many countries appear to have moved to individual filing to capture the labor
efficiency gains of taxing married women at lower marginal rates. See OECD
REPORT, supra note 243, at 56; McCaffery, supra note 242, at 218–19.  Efficiency R
is often a popular and forceful rationale for changing tax laws in the United States
(witness the Bush tax cuts on high incomes, capital gains, and dividends).  Given
the well-documented inefficiencies engendered by the joint return, its persistence
in the United States is somewhat surprising.  On the other hand, some scholars
have questioned the claim that joint taxation depresses work effort by married
women. See Robert A. Pollak, Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to
the Analysis of Joint Taxation, 57 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 216, 216 (2011).  Further-
more, as Marjorie Kornhauser notes, strong cultural, religious, and political
forces in the United States may explain the persistence of the joint return. See
Kornhauser, supra note 207, at 650. R
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developed a thoughtful and thorough proposal for mandatory
individual filing modeled in part on Canada’s individual tax
filing system.244
With respect to the marital deduction and related provi-
sions, Bridget Crawford has proposed to eliminate entirely the
marital deduction along with related provisions such as gift
splitting and QTIP trusts.245  Under her proposal the exemp-
tion amount for each individual would be increased to $10
million.246  Similarly, Pat Cain proposed that the exemption
amount be increased to $5 million as a way of minimizing the
importance of the marital deduction.247  Crawford and Cain’s
recommendation to increase the exemption amount has come
to pass, as the exemption amount is now $5.34 million.248
However, instead of repealing the marital deduction, as Craw-
ford recommended, Congress expanded the preference for
spousal transfers through portability.249  Other possibilities for
reform of spousal transfers under the gift and estate tax could
be modeled after other countries.250
Related to eliminating the joint return are reforms that
would eliminate marriage as a proxy for economic interdepen-
dence, so that means-based provisions such as the EITC would
take account of a diverse range of households.  As an alterna-
tive to individual filing, Anne Alstott considers a household
filing system similar to that used for welfare transfer programs,
although she has concerns about the administrability and in-
trusiveness of such a system.251  Infanti would adopt a hybrid
244 See generally Infanti, supra note 9, at 623–64 (proposing an inclusive R
United States individual tax filing system based on the Canadian Income Tax Act).
245 See Crawford, supra note 9, at 797, 801; see also Dodge, supra note 67, at R
1748 (recommending a return to the pre-ERTA marital deduction for up to half the
decedent’s estate and the repeal of the QTIP trust rules); Gerzog, supra note 9, at R
327 (recommending repeal of the QTIP trust rules).
246 See Crawford, supra note 9, at 797–98.  At the time Crawford’s proposal R
was made, in 2003, the exclusion amount was only $1 million, scheduled to
increase in increments up to $3.5 million in 2009, and then, in 2010, the estate
tax was scheduled to be repealed. See id. at 779 n.116.
247 See Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 677, 702–03, 707 (2000).
248 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. R
249 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. R
250 See Lisa Philipps, Tax Policy and the Gendered Distribution of Wealth, in
RETHINKING RESTRUCTURING: GENDER AND CHANGE IN CANADA 141, 152–55 (Isabella
Bakker ed., 1996) (recommending that Canada’s exemption for spousal transfers
be reconsidered and possibly repealed).
251 See Anne L. Alstott, supra note 206, at 744–48; see also Cain, Imagine R
There’s No Marriage, supra note 202, at 57–60 (recommending the adoption of the R
household as a taxpaying unit but expressing privacy concerns).
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system of individual filing that could be modified to take ac-
count of economic interdependencies where necessary.252
CONCLUSION
Windsor heralds the recognition of a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage and promises equality in the tax treatment
of same- and different-sex marriage.  However, Windsor, and
now Obergefell, will fail to deliver on the promise of tax equality
unless we relinquish the fiction of marital unity.  As long as we
persist in the mistaken assumption that the married couple is
an irreducible economic unit, we will continue to favor one
model of marriage at the expense of other more egalitarian
models.  The joint return will continue to reward single-earner
couples and penalize two-earner couples.  The gift and estate
tax marital deduction will continue to benefit couples who are
unequals in wealth and power.  The EITC and other aspects of
the tax law will continue to equate marriage with economic
interdependence, a proxy that is increasingly problematic in
view of today’s fluid and varied family formations.
This Article predicts that women in same-sex marriages
will suffer the failures of Windsor in disproportion to other
married people.  We should not wait to see whether that predic-
tion is borne out.  Instead, we should refuse to tolerate a law of
marriage taxation that attaches immediate and concrete finan-
cial rewards and penalties to different types of intimate rela-
tionships.  Only by removing marriage from the tax law can we
begin to create a tax system that will allow a diversity of rela-
tionships to flourish and fulfill the promise of Windsor.
252 See Infanti, supra note 9, at 662–63. R
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